Chipre: calote em metade do dinheiro sujo da kleptocracia russa

La quita final de los depósitos del Bank of Cyprus será del 47,5%

El Pais, 29/07/2013

Economia / EFE

Al final, la quita de los depósitos no garantizados —los que superan los 100.000 euros— del Bank of Cyprus por el rescate financiero al país será del 47,5%, según el acuerdo que han alcanzado el Gobierno chipriota y la troika de acreedores formada por Banco Central Europeo, Comisión Europea y Fondo Monetario Internacional.
"La tasa es significativamente inferior a la previsión original de hace cuatro meses" ha señalado el viceportavoz del Ejecutivo de Nicosia, Víctor Papadópulos al dar a conocer la noticia. "Este es un desarrollo positivo para la economía del país y los depositantes afectados", ha apuntado.
En su decreto de marzo, el Banco Central había establecido, en una primera fase, una quita del 37,5% para los depósitos del Bank of Cyprus—la mayor entidad del país— que superaran la cantidad de 100.000 euros. Ese porcentaje ya ha sido transformado en acciones del banco.
Al mismo tiempo 22,5% de los depósitos no garantizados había sido bloqueado, a la espera de  una valoración definitiva sobre cuál sería el monto final necesario para garantizar la solvencia. Esta medida provisional elevaba el riesgo de la quita, que se ha quedado en el 47,5%, hasta al 60%.
Con esta decisión, según Papadópulos, se da un paso importante para que el Bank of Cyprus pueda abandonar el estatus de reestructuración y para que la nueva directiva pueda empezar a funcionar con normalidad. Al abandonar el estatus de "reestructuración" se sientan las bases para una normalización paulatina del sistema bancario chipriota, sometido a estrictos controles del movimiento de capitales desde marzo pasado.
La decisión sobre la cuantía de la quita llega después de que la troika y las autoridades chipriotas analizaran el informe de la auditoría KPMG de Londres sobre los activos del banco. Los acreedores, que iniciaron el pasado día 17 su primera misión de evaluación del programa de ajuste chipriota, analizaron también las cuentas de Banco Popular (Laiki). Los activos de esta entidad quedaron divididos en un banco malo y otro bueno —este últimos integrados en el Bank of Cyprus— tras decidirse su liquidación en marzo.
Además de los depósitos garantizados —los inferiores a 100.000 euros—, los créditos y otros activos de buena calidad, el Banco de Chipre asumió la deuda los 9.000 millones de euros que Laiki tenía a través del mecanismo de Financiación de Emergencia.
La directora de la Comisión del Mercado de Valores de Chipre, Dimitra Kaloyiru, ha afirmado recientemente que espera que el Bank of Cyprus pueda volver a cotizar en Bolsa en octubre, tras quedar en suspenso su cotización en abril pasado, al estallar la crisis bancaria.

Uma super Pascoa russa (com direito a tudo o que eles ja' fizeram...)

Pois é, eu já tinha feito aqui um post sobre aquela velha história do ladrão que rouba ladrão, não é mesmo?
Não sei se terá cem anos de perdão, mas podem contar com ódio eterno do governo, dos novos ricos, dos mafiosos, dos capitalistas russos, enfim, de tutti quanti tinham enriquecido honestamente na Rússia, nos últimos 20 anos, e que tinham se dedicado a fazer um pouco de caridade com uma pequena ilha semi-pobre do Mediterrâneo.
Essa falta de garantia sobre a riqueza adquirida ainda vai matar o capitalismo...
Paulo Roberto de Almeida

Confisco pode chegar a 60% para os clientes do Banco de Chipre

Situação só não é pior do que no banco Laiki, onde os correntistas com mais de € 100 mil perderão 100%

Andrei Netto, correspondente

PARIS - Uma semana após a aprovação de um plano de resgate de € 17 bilhões, o governo do Chipre e os correntistas dos maiores bancos do país começam a descobrir a amplitude do confisco exigido pela União Europeia, o Banco Central Europeu (BCE) e o Fundo Monetário Internacional (FMI). Cálculos preliminares e extraoficiais indicam que o corte no saldo de contas correntes, poupanças e investimentos com mais de € 100 mil poderá chegar a 60% para os clientes do Banco de Chipre, o maior da ilha. A situação só não é pior do que no banco Laiki, onde os correntistas com recursos acima deste valor perderão 100%.
O confisco de recursos de investidores privados foi a fórmula encontrada por Bruxelas e pelo FMI para fazer com que o governo cipriota arrecade € 7 bilhões em recursos, montante da contrapartida do país aos € 10 bilhões em recursos internacionais que lhes serão emprestados. Pelo acordo de socorro, o Banco Laiki (Popular) será extinto. Clientes com menos de € 100 mil serão transferidos ao Banco de Chipre, enquanto os demais perderão seus recursos.
O memorando de entendimento também previa o confisco de parte dos recursos dos clientes do Banco de Chipre. Há uma semana, Jeroen Dijsselbloem, coordenador do fórum de ministros de Finanças da zona do euro (Eurogrupo), havia estimado os cortes entre 25% e 40%. No sábado à noite, o Banco Central cipriota informou que o corte será de 37,5%, valor que será transformado em ações da instituição - o que transformará, compulsoriamente, os correntistas em sócios do banco. Além disso, outros 22,5% serão congelados e poderão ser confiscados caso o governo precise de recursos extras.
"A primeira estimativa feita é de que 37,5% dos depósitos acima de € 100 mil serão convertidos em ações", confirmou o ministro das Finanças, Michalis Sarris. "Por segurança, uma vez que os cálculos foram feitos sobre o montante que precisamos, 22,5% ficarão em separado." Segundo nota do BC cipriota, a decisão será informada "90 dias após o fim da avaliação".
Alternativas
Conforme o porta-voz do governo cipriota, Christos Stylianides, as autoridades também buscarão outras alternativas para geração de recursos, "investigando todos os aspectos da crise no setor bancário". Para Stylianides, as opções podem incluir "a supressão ou a redução de empréstimos e outros serviços fornecidos por bancos cipriotas no país e no exterior".
Chipre viveu um feriado bancário de 12 dias em razão da turbulência financeira no país. As agências bancárias foram reabertas na quinta-feira, mas um controle de fluxo de capitais, estabelecendo limites estritos para os correntistas, entre os quais saques de € 300 por semana e transferências internacionais de até € 5 mil por mês.
Segundo relatório do Instituto da Finança Internacional (IIF), o órgão que representa grandes investidores mundiais, o plano de socorro da UE para o Chipre causará uma depressão da ordem de 20% do Produto Interno Bruto (PIB) do país em apenas dois anos. Para efeitos de comparação, a Grécia, nação mais atingida pela recessão na Europa, levou cinco anos para chegar à depressão de 20%.

VEJA TAMBÉM

• Bancos do Chipre reabrem com grandes filas e restrição a transações
• Chipre impõe controle para evitar corrida a bancos

A Suica virou maior do que a UE...

De repente, o setor financeiro suiço, frequentemente desprezado e acusado de todo tipo de malversação, virou atrativo novamente.
Será que o setor bancário suiço vai ter capacidade de absorver todos os capitais que vão começar a fugir da zona do euro?
Os chineses podem ganhar, no longo prazo, via Hong Kong e Cingapura...
Paulo Roberto de Almeida

Europe's Disturbing Precedent in the Cyprus Bailout

March 26, 2013 | 0900 GMT

Stratfor

By George Friedman
Founder and Chairman
The European economic crisis has taken different forms in different places, and Cyprus is the latest country to face the prospect of financial ruin. Overextended banks in Cyprus are teetering on the brink of failure for issuing loans they cannot repay, which has prompted the tiny Mediterranean country, a member of the European Union, to turn to Brussels for help. Late Sunday, the European Union and Cypriot president announced new terms for a bailout that would provide the infusion of cash necessary to prevent bankruptcies in Cyprus' banking sector and, more important, prevent a banking panic from spreading to the rest of Europe.
What makes this crisis different from the previous bailouts for Greece, Ireland or elsewhere are the conditions Brussels has attached for its assistance. Due to circumstances unique to Cyprus, namely the questionable origin of a large chunk of the deposits in its now-stricken banking sector and that sector's small size relative to the overall European economy, the European Union, led by Germany, has taken a harder line with the country. Cyprus has few sources of capital besides its capacity as a banking shelter, so Brussels required that the country raise part of the necessary funds from its own banking sector -- possibly by seizing money from certain bank deposits and putting it toward the bailout fund. The proposal has not yet been approved, but if enacted it would undermine a formerly sacred principle of banking in most industrial nations -- the security of deposits -- setting a new and possibly destabilizing precedent in Europe.

Cyprus' Dilemma

For years before the crisis, Cyprus promoted itself as an offshore financial center by creating a tax structure and banking rules that made depositing money in the country attractive to foreigners. As a result, Cyprus' financial sector grew to dwarf the rest of the Cypriot economy, accounting for about eight times the country's annual gross domestic product and employing a substantial portion of the nation's work force. A side effect of this strategy, however, was that if the financial sector experienced problems, the rest of the domestic economy would not be big enough to stabilize the banks without outside help.
Europe's economic crisis spawned precisely those sorts of problems for the Cypriot banking sector. This was not just a concern for Cyprus, though. Even though Cyprus' banking sector is tiny relative to the rest of Europe's, one Cypriot bank defaulting on what it owed other banks could put the whole European banking system in question, and the last thing the European Union needs now is a crisis of confidence in its banks.
The Cypriots were facing chaos if their banks failed because the insurance system was insufficient to cover the claims of depositors. For its part, the European Union could not risk the financial contagion. But Brussels could not simply bail out the entire banking system, both because of the precedent it would set and because the political support for a total bailout wasn't there. This was particularly the case for Germany, which would carry much of the financial burden and is preparing for elections in September 2013 before an electorate that is increasingly hostile to bailouts.
Even though the German public may oppose the bailouts, it benefits immensely from what those bailouts preserve. As I have pointed out many times, Germany is heavily dependent on exports and the European Union is critical to those exports as a free trade zone. Although Germany also imports a great deal from the rest of the bloc, a break in the free trade zone would be catastrophic for the German economy. If all imports were cut along with exports, Germany would still be devastated because what it produces and exports and what it imports are very different things. Germany could not absorb all its production and would experience massive unemployment.
Currently, Germany's unemployment rate is below 6 percent while Spain's is above 25 percent. An exploding financial crisis would cut into consumption, which would particularly hurt an export-dependent country like Germany. Berlin's posture through much of the European economic crisis has been to pretend it is about to stop providing assistance to other countries, but the fact is that doing so would inflict pain on Germany, too. Germany will make its threats and its voters will be upset, but in the end, the country would not be enjoying high employment if the crisis got out of hand. So the German game is to constantly threaten to let someone sink, while in the end doing whatever has to be done.
Cyprus was a place where Germany could show its willingness to get tough but didn't carry any of the risks that would arise in pushing a country such as Spain too hard, for example. Cyprus' economy was small enough and its problems unique enough that the rest of Europe could dismiss any measures taken against the country as a one-off. Here was a case where the German position appears enormously more powerful than usual. And in isolation, this is true -- if we ignore the question of what conclusion the rest of Europe, and the world, draws from the treatment of Cyprus.

A Firmer Line

Under German guidance, the European Union made an extraordinary demand on the Cypriots. It demanded that a tax be placed on deposits in the country's two largest banks. The tax would be about 10 percent and would, under the initial terms, be applied to all accounts, regardless of their size. This was an unprecedented solution. Since the global financial crisis of the 1920s, all advanced industrial countries -- and many others -- had been operating on a fundamental principle that deposits in banks were utterly secure. They were not regarded as bonds paying certain interest, whose value would disappear if the bank failed. Deposits were regarded as riskless placements of money, with the risk covered by deposit insurance for smaller deposits, but in practical terms, guaranteed by the national wealth.
This guarantee meant that individual savings would be safe and that working capital parked by corporations in a bank was safe as well. The alternative was not only uncertainty, but also people hoarding cash and preventing it from entering the financial system. It was necessary to have a secure place to put money so that it was available for lending. The runs on banks in the 1920s and 1930s drove home the need for total security for deposits.
Brussels demanded that the bailout for Cypriot banks be partly paid for by depositors in those banks. That demand essentially violated the social contract on the sanctity of bank deposits and did so in a country that was a member of the European Union -- one of the world's major economic blocs. Proponents of the measure pointed out that many of the depositors were not Cypriot nationals but rather foreigners, many of whom were Russian. Moreover, it was suggested that the only reason for a Russian to be putting money in a Cypriot bank was to get it out of Russia, and the only motive for that had to be nefarious. It followed that the confiscation was not targeted against ordinary people but against shady Russians.
There is no question that there are shady Russians putting money into Cyprus. But ordinary Cypriots had their money in the same banks and so did many Cypriot and foreign companies, including European companies, who were doing business in Cyprus and need money for payroll and so on. The proposal might look like an attempt to seize Russian money, but it would pinch the bank accounts of all Cypriots as well as a sizable amount of legitimate Russian money. Confiscating 10 percent of all deposits could devastate individuals and the overall economy and likely would prompt companies operating in Cyprus to move their cash elsewhere. The measure would have been devastating and the Cypriot parliament rejected it.
Another deal, the one currently up for approval, tried to mitigate the problem but still broke the social contract. Accounts smaller than 100,000 euros (about $128,000) would not be touched. However, accounts larger than 100,000 euros would be taxed at an uncertain rate, currently estimated at 20 percent, while bondholders would lose up to 40 percent. These numbers will likely shift again, but assuming they are close to the final figures, depositors putting money into banks beyond this amount are at risk depending on the financial condition of the bank.
The impact on Cyprus is more than Russian mafia money being taxed. All corporations doing business in Cyprus could have 20 percent of their operating cash seized. Regardless of precisely how the Cypriot banking system is restructured, the fact is that the European Union demanded that Cyprus seize portions of bank accounts from large depositors. From a business' perspective, 100,000 euros is not all that much when you are running a supermarket or a car dealership or a construction company, but this arbitrary level could easily be raised in the future and the mere existence of the measure will make attracting investment more difficult.

A New Precedent

The more significant development was the fact that the European Union has now made it official policy, under certain circumstances, to encourage member states to seize depositors' assets to pay for the stabilization of financial institutions. To put it simply, if you are a business, the safety of your money in a bank depends on the bank's financial condition and the political considerations of the European Union. What had been a haven -- no risk and minimal returns -- now has minimal returns and unknown risks. Brussels' emphasis that this was mostly Russian money is not assuring, either. More than just Russian money stands to be taken for the bailout fund if the new policy is approved. Moreover, the point of the global banking system is that money is safe wherever it is deposited. Europe has other money centers, like Luxembourg, where the financial system outstrips gross domestic product. There are no problems there right now, but as we have learned, the European Union is an uncertain place. If Russian deposits can be seized in Nicosia, why not American deposits in Luxembourg?
This was why it was so important to emphasize the potentially criminal nature of the Russian deposits and to downplay the effect on ordinary law-abiding Cypriots. Brussels has worked very hard to make the Cyprus case seem unique and non-replicable: Cyprus is small and its banking system attracted criminals, so the principle that deposits in banks are secure doesn't necessarily apply there. Another way to look at it is that an EU member, like some other members of the bloc, could not guarantee the solvency of its banks so Brussels forced the country to seize deposits in order to receive help stabilizing the system. Viewed that way, the European Union has established a new option for itself in dealing with depositors in troubled banks, and that principle now applies to all of Europe, particularly to those countries with financial institutions potentially facing similar problems.
The question, of course, is whether foreign depositors in European banks will accept that Cyprus was one of a kind. If they decide that it isn't obvious, then foreign corporations -- and even European corporations -- could start pulling at least part of their cash out of European banks and putting it elsewhere. They can minimize the amount of cash on hand in Europe by shifting to non-European banks and transferring as needed. Those withdrawals, if they occur, could create a massive liquidity crisis in Europe. At the very least, every reasonable CFO will now assume that the risk in Europe has risen and that an eye needs to be kept on the financial health of institutions where they have deposits. In Europe, depositing money in a bank is no longer a no-brainer.
Now we must ask ourselves why the Germans would have created this risk. One answer is that they were confident they could convince depositors that Cyprus was one of a kind and not to be repeated. The other answer was that they had no choice. The first explanation was undermined March 25, when Eurogroup President Jeroen Dijsselbloem said that the model used in Cyprus could be used in future bank bailouts. Locked in by an electorate that does not fully understand Germany's vulnerability, the German government decided it had to take a hard line on Cyprus regardless of risk. Or Germany may be preparing a new strategy for the management of the European financial crisis. The banking system in Europe is too big to salvage if it comes to a serious crisis. Any solution will involve the loss of depositors' money. Contemplating that concept could lead to a run on banks that would trigger the crisis Europe fears. Solving a crisis and guaranteeing depositors may be seen as having impossible consequences. Setting the precedent in Cyprus has the advantage of not appearing to be a precedent.
It's not clear what the Germans or the EU negotiators are thinking, and all these theories are speculative. What is certain is that an EU country, facing a crisis in its financial system, is now weighing whether to pay for that crisis by seizing depositors' money. And with that, the Europeans have broken a barrier that has been in place since the 1930s. They didn't do that casually and they didn't do that because they wanted to. But they did it.

Read more: Europe's Disturbing Precedent in the Cyprus Bailout | Stratfor

Ladrao que rouba ladrao...

...tem cem anos de perdão?
Calma, não estou acusando os nossos estimados russos atuais, pós-soviéticos (será mesmo?), de serem ladrões, longe disso.
Claro, sabemos de alguns poucos que insistem no capitalismo mafioso, na corrupção desenfreada, na promiscuidade entre bens públicos e propriedade privada, nos desvios de justiça, nas manipulações estatais sobre bens públicos e privados, enfim em tudo isso, mas eles são muito poucos, pouquíssimos e absolutamente não são representativos da sociedade e do Estado russo atuais, corretos, honestos, transparentes, todos eles engajados num sistema de mercado luzídio, aberto, concorrencial, limpíssimo. Não podemos confundir as maçãs podres com a caixa de frutas, sobretudo com aquelas que vão para a salada de frutas, apreciada das novas elites, que professam amizade eterna ao Ocidente e aos valores democráticos, que amam a OTAN e tudo o que sai do G7.
Estou me referindo aos bárbaros bolcheviques, que quase cem anos atrás decretaram o calote oficial da dívida externa, confiscaram a propriedade de estrangeiros, capitalistas exploradores e banqueiros sedentos de lucros extraordinários, enfim todos os exploradores capitalistas que foram, finalmente, expropriados pela gloriosa revolução de Outubro, o farol do proletariado que se levantou contra a burguesia, os kulaks e os imperialistas, no que fizeram muito bem.
Ops, parece que agora esses detestáveis personagens do capitalismo monopolista internacional, com a ajuda dos esbirros do FMI e dos seus asseclas colonizados de países dependentes, resolveram se vingar do roubo perpetrado em 1917, e pegaram os camaradas russos de supresa, confiscando todas as riquezas honestamente amealhadas em duas décadas de construção do capitalismo na Rússia.
Durma-se com um barulho desses...
Paulo Roberto de Almeida

Russian Leader Warns, “Get All Money Out Of Western Banks Now!”
CantonDailyLedger
22 Mar 2013

A Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) “urgent bulletin” being sent to Embassies around the world today is advising both Russian citizens and companies to begin divesting their assets from Western banking and financial institutions “immediately” as Kremlin fears grow that both the European Union and United States are preparing for the largest theft of private wealth in modern history.

According to this “urgent bulletin,” this warning is being made at the behest of Prime Minister Medvedev who earlier today warned against the Western banking systems actions against EU Member Cyprus by stating:

“All possible mistakes that could be made have been made by them, the measure that was proposed is of a confiscation nature, and unprecedented in its character. I can’t compare it with anything but … decisions made by Soviet authorities … when they didn’t think much about the savings of their population. But we are living in the 21st century, under market economic conditions. Everybody has been insisting that ownership rights should be respected.”

Medvedev’s statements echo those of President Putin who, likewise, warned about the EU’s unprecedented private asset grab in Cyprus calling it “unjust, unprofessional, and dangerous.”

In our 17 March report “Europe Recoils In Shock After Bankster Raid, US Warned Is Next” we noted how Russian entities have €23-31 billion ($30-$40) in cross-border loans to Cypriot companies tied to Moscow, and €9 billion ($12 billion) on deposit with Cypriot banks [as compared to the €127 billion ($166 billion) being kept in similar circumstances by 60 of the United States largest corporations in offshore accounts to avoid paying American taxes] which are in danger of being confiscated by EU banksters.

Russia invade Chipre para recuperar seu capital

Brincadeira antecipada de Primeiro de Abril, claro, mas parece que seria a única maneira de os grandes correntistas russos, indignados com o sequestro de todo aquele dinheiro honesto adquirido com os ingentes esforços do capitalismo russo para contribuir ao desenvolvimento cipriota, tentarem recuperar pelo menos parte do investimento feito naqueles bancos cipriotas que perguntavam pouco e prometiam muito.
Paulo Roberto de Almeida

Cyprus Bailout Agrees Large Losses on Uninsured Depositors.
Citi Research, 25/03/2013

Deal consists of €10bn financial assistance envelope to be disbursed via the ESM, with some contributions possibly from IMF and Russia. In exchange, Cyprus agreed to resolve its second largest bank, Popular Bank of Cyprus (Laiki), merging its “good” assets and insured depositors into Bank of Cyprus. Insured deposits (below €100k) in both banks are safeguarded. Equity shareholders and all bondholders in both banks will be fully bailed in. Uninsured deposits in Laiki will be fully bailed in, while uninsured deposits in Bank of Cyprus will be converted into equity and suffer major losses targeted to ensure that the bank capital ratio ultimately is brought to 9%. Uninsured deposits in Bank of Cyprus will be frozen during the process and major liquidity restrictions and capital controls are being put in place. Legislation on a bank resolution regime was already approved by Cypriot parliament, allowing government to implement decisions taken last night without further parliamentary approval. Comment: The deal is a much more straightforward way of dealing with insolvent banks, rather than spreading the costs throughout the whole banking system. The deal removes to a large extent short-term uncertainty and the risk of uncontrolled bank bankruptcies which might possibly have led to Cyprus exiting EMU. However, with confidence in the Cyprus banking sector severely hit by developments of the past week, the risk of major deposit outflows occurring when capital controls are eventually removed (or softened) remains significant, in our view.

Chipre: a ilha de todos os traficos - Estadao e Paul Krugman

Raramente concordo com o keynesianismo exacerbado de Paul Krugman, mas agora, neste artigo sobre Chipre, ele relata simplesmente a verdade. A ilha se tornou uma lavanderia russa, para dinheiro legal e ilegal, o que obviamente não pode ser tolerado.
A conta vai sair cara, para todas as partes...
Paulo Roberto de Almeida

Barbeiragem em Chipre

22 de março de 2013 | 2h 09

Editorial O Estado de S.Paulo

Em meio aos gigantes da economia europeia que estão em dificuldades, coube a Chipre, um minúsculo país de 1 milhão de habitantes, com um Produto Interno Bruto de apenas US$ 23,6 bilhões, protagonizar uma crise financeira que ameaça despejar gasolina no incêndio da zona do euro. O caso todo é uma mistura de arrogância política e erros de avaliação.
A própria presença de Chipre na União Europeia (UE) - uma óbvia anomalia, já que nem o sistema financeiro do país nem sua economia respeitam os padrões mínimos exigidos pela UE - é fruto de um jogo de conveniências. Os reticentes dirigentes europeus tiveram de engolir Chipre em 2004 por pressão da Grécia, que ameaçava vetar o ingresso da Polônia e da República Checa, entre outros países do Leste Europeu, caso os cipriotas não fossem aceitos. Como se sabe, a ilha é dividida entre cipriotas gregos e turcos desde 1974, e o interesse de Atenas ao forçar a adesão de Chipre à UE era deslegitimar de vez a porção sob influência turca, que já não tem reconhecimento internacional. A UE, por sua vez, esperava que houvesse a reunificação de Chipre antes de aceitar seu ingresso, mas cedeu aos gregos. Pouco depois, os cipriotas gregos rejeitaram a reunificação em referendo, enterrando de vez as ilusões de que a entrada de Chipre no clube do euro pudesse facilitar o processo de paz. Assim, não surpreende a má vontade com que os cipriotas estão sendo tratados neste momento pelas autoridades europeias.
Chipre já não gozava de nenhuma confiança no resto do continente, o que explica a violência do pacote de socorro proposto pela UE e pelo FMI - que previa, além da tradicional exigência de austeridade fiscal, o confisco de parte dos depósitos bancários para ajudar a pagar a conta do resgate. Mas os duros termos do resgate revelam que os eleitores das potências europeias, a esta altura, não acreditam mais nos argumentos de seus governantes para socorrer países quebrados e só admitem que a ajuda seja liberada se esses países forem submetidos a condições muito mais severas do que as impostas até agora. A crise na zona do euro, portanto, não é apenas econômica, mas também de credibilidade política.
Não é de hoje, aliás, que os europeus do norte consideram os do sul irresponsáveis, corruptos e perdulários - portanto, indignos de solidariedade em momentos de penúria. A necessidade de consolidar a União Europeia abafou esse sentimento, mas a aguda crise na Grécia, na Espanha e na Itália tirou o gênio da garrafa e escancarou a dificuldade de conciliar culturas políticas tão distintas. Nesse contexto, a chanceler da Alemanha, Angela Merkel, que deveria ter defendido o resgate cipriota a despeito de sua impopularidade, ante o potencial explosivo da crise, preferiu o conforto de uma solução demagógica e irresponsável - teme-se, com razão, que o precedente aberto pelo confisco deflagre uma corrida aos bancos também na Itália, na Espanha, em Portugal e na Grécia, justamente no momento em que essas economias lutam para reequilibrar-se.
Ademais, as exigências da UE para o resgate cipriota não tocam em outro ponto importante: Chipre é uma lavanderia de dinheiro para milionários russos envolvidos em negócios obscuros. O certo seria controlar parte desses depósitos, mas o governo cipriota não quis melindrar a Rússia, responsável por uma ajuda de US$ 3,3 bilhões ao país, e decidiu que seriam taxadas as contas com valores abaixo de 100 mil, atingindo os correntistas comuns, cujos depósitos são garantidos pela legislação europeia. Não surpreende, portanto, que o Parlamento cipriota tenha rejeitado a exigência.
Discute-se a alternativa de que a Rússia possa socorrer Chipre novamente, em troca da exploração de suas reservas de gás - calcula-se que a ilha tenha o equivalente a 40% das necessidades da UE, hoje dependente do gás que vem da Rússia. Logo, um dos efeitos importantes da crise cipriota pode acabar sendo o aumento da influência russa no continente, algo que os dirigentes europeus certamente não esperavam quando aceitaram Chipre na UE.
===============

The New York Times, March 21, 2013

Treasure Island Trauma

By PAUL KRUGMAN

A couple of years ago, the journalist Nicholas Shaxson published a fascinating, chilling book titled “Treasure Islands,” which explained how international tax havens — which are also, as the author pointed out, “secrecy jurisdictions” where many rules don’t apply — undermine economies around the world. Not only do they bleed revenues from cash-strapped governments and enable corruption; they distort the flow of capital, helping to feed ever-bigger financial crises.

One question Mr. Shaxson didn’t get into much, however, is what happens when a secrecy jurisdiction itself goes bust. That’s the story of Cyprus right now. And whatever the outcome for Cyprus itself (hint: it’s not likely to be happy), the Cyprus mess shows just how unreformed the world banking system remains, almost five years after the global financial crisis began.

So, about Cyprus: You might wonder why anyone cares about a tiny nation with an economy not much bigger than that of metropolitan Scranton, Pa. Cyprus is, however, a member of the euro zone, so events there could trigger contagion (for example, bank runs) in larger nations. And there’s something else: While the Cypriot economy may be tiny, it’s a surprisingly large financial player, with a banking sector four or five times as big as you might expect given the size of its economy.

Why are Cypriot banks so big? Because the country is a tax haven where corporations and wealthy foreigners stash their money. Officially, 37 percent of the deposits in Cypriot banks come from nonresidents; the true number, once you take into account wealthy expatriates and people who are only nominally resident in Cyprus, is surely much higher. Basically, Cyprus is a place where people, especially but not only Russians, hide their wealth from both the taxmen and the regulators. Whatever gloss you put on it, it’s basically about money-laundering.

And the truth is that much of the wealth never moved at all; it just became invisible. On paper, for example, Cyprus became a huge investor in Russia — much bigger than Germany, whose economy is hundreds of times larger. In reality, of course, this was just “roundtripping” by Russians using the island as a tax shelter.

Unfortunately for the Cypriots, enough real money came in to finance some seriously bad investments, as their banks bought Greek debt and lent into a vast real estate bubble. Sooner or later, things were bound to go wrong. And now they have.

Now what? There are some strong similarities between Cyprus now and Iceland (a similar-size economy) a few years back. Like Cyprus now, Iceland had a huge banking sector, swollen by foreign deposits, that was simply too big to bail out. Iceland’s response was essentially to let its banks go bust, wiping out those foreign investors, while protecting domestic depositors — and the results weren’t too bad. Indeed, Iceland, with a far lower unemployment rate than most of Europe, has weathered the crisis surprisingly well.

Unfortunately, Cyprus’s response to its crisis has been a hopeless muddle. In part, this reflects the fact that it no longer has its own currency, which makes it dependent on decision makers in Brussels and Berlin — decision makers who haven’t been willing to let banks openly fail.

But it also reflects Cyprus’s own reluctance to accept the end of its money-laundering business; its leaders are still trying to limit losses to foreign depositors in the vain hope that business as usual can resume, and they were so anxious to protect the big money that they tried to limit foreigners’ losses by expropriating small domestic depositors. As it turned out, however, ordinary Cypriots were outraged, the plan was rejected, and, at this point, nobody knows what will happen.

My guess is that, in the end, Cyprus will adopt something like the Icelandic solution, but unless it ends up being forced off the euro in the next few days — a real possibility — it may first waste a lot of time and money on half-measures, trying to avoid facing up to reality while running up huge debts to wealthier nations. We’ll see.

But step back for a minute and consider the incredible fact that tax havens like Cyprus, the Cayman Islands, and many more are still operating pretty much the same way that they did before the global financial crisis. Everyone has seen the damage that runaway bankers can inflict, yet much of the world’s financial business is still routed through jurisdictions that let bankers sidestep even the mild regulations we’ve put in place. Everyone is crying about budget deficits, yet corporations and the wealthy are still freely using tax havens to avoid paying taxes like the little people.

So don’t cry for Cyprus; cry for all of us, living in a world whose leaders seem determined not to learn from disaster.