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Mostrando postagens com marcador golpe militar. Mostrar todas as postagens
Mostrando postagens com marcador golpe militar. Mostrar todas as postagens

sexta-feira, 31 de março de 2023

"Aniversário" do golpe militar que inaugurou a mais longeva ditadura da história do Brasil: 31 de março de 1964 - Chico Alves, Leonardo Sakamoto, Josias de Souza (UOL)

 Para não deixar passar em branco o aniversário da famigerada.

Se ouso um toque de ironia sombria, graças à "Redentora" dos milicos, eu me politizei bem cedo, ainda adolescente, e comecei a ler sobre política, logo tornando-me um opositor decidido: saí a tempo de não ser preso, torturado, eventualmente "desaparecido", como tantos outros. Voltei 7 anos depois dos anos de chumbo.

Os artigos no site do UOL:
Colunistas lembram e lamentam aniversário do golpe de 64
Rodrigo Barradas, editor de Opinião

Para surpresa de ninguém, o Clube Militar do Rio comemorou o golpe de 64 nesta sexta. Enquanto na Lagoa Rodrigo de Freitas delírios revisionistas e autoritários fermentavam junto ao bufê, aqui no UOL os colunistas marcavam a data pelo que ela foi: o início de uma ditadura que ainda não foi devidamente processada.

Chico Alves lembrou depoimentos de vítimas do torturador Carlos Brilhante Ustra, herói de Bolsonaro e do senador Hamilton Mourão. Leonardo Sakamoto cobrou das Forças Armadas um exercício de autocrítica. E Josias de Souza, falando com os 99% de civis da população, arremata: "Brasil precisa parar de tratar militar como bibelô".

sexta-feira, 18 de junho de 2021

Existe algum risco de golpe militar no Brasil? Não, embora o capitão gostaria que ocorresse - Paulo Roberto de Almeida

 Existe algum risco de golpe de Estado por militares no Brasil? Não, mas o capitão está preparando algum. Não conseguirá...

Paulo Roberto de Almeida

Não veja riscos imediatos de o Brasil resvalar para um governo autocrático, ou seja, uma ditadura aberta, em moldes tradicionais; o próprio regime militar, na sua longa duração de duas décadas, se encarregou de “vacinar” o Brasil contra novas incidências desse tipo. Mas é um fato que os últimos dois anos e meio de um desgoverno medíocre e caótico redundaram numa deterioração sensível de muitas das instituições de Estado, bem como da qualidade das políticas públicas de governo. Não existe nenhuma dúvida que o personagem nefasto que ocupa a cadeira presidencial gostaria de se ver dotado ou investido de poderes que a Constituição lhe veda, ou de exercer algum controle sobre as duas outras instituições de Estado, e suas agências especializadas. Entre estas, também é notório que as FFAA, de modo geral, mas o Exército em particular, se envolveram ou se deixaram envolver numa ação de apoio político (e até logístico, quando não eleitoral) que redundaram nessa deterioração institucional que já é evidente e perigosa. 

Os militares, em geral, e determinados setores em particular, atuaram em total contradição com os requerimentos de uma situação em completo descalabro financeiro, buscando e obtendo vantagens corporativas e pessoais que estão em nítido descompasso com o presente estado econômico do país e das contas públicas. O mais surpreendente é, justamente, a subserviência demonstrada em diversos episódios constrangedores aos olhos da opinião pública, quando não da ética e da moralidade política. Esse rebaixamento de padrões já se manifestou em pesquisas de opinião registrando a nítida diminuição e deterioração da imagem geralmente positiva que as FFAA tinham conquistado três décadas depois do final da ditadura militar, da qual elas saíram bastante chamuscadas em seu prestígio e imagem pública, quando não em sua qualidade técnica a serviço da nação. 

Assim como o presente desgoverno não tem precedentes em toda a história do país, não existem registros comparáveis quanto à imagem pública das FFAA, salvo em momentos de comoção política mais forte: revoltas tenentistas do início do século XX, golpe do Estado Novo e implantação de uma feroz ditadura, novamente golpe militar em 1964, com episódios sombrios que mancharam a honra e a reputação das Forças e de seus integrantes – envolvidos em casos de torturas, assassinatos, desaparecimentos, arbítrio e violência, atos de crueldade e de desumanidade raramente vistos em nossa história – e inclusive colocaram certos setores das FFAA numa situação de rompimento com o Estado de Direito e com preceitos claros de natureza constitucional. 

Mas, todos os episódios anteriores tinham um claro contexto de conflitos no próprio tecido social e no sistema político nacional. Atualmente, temos o primeiro exemplo histórico, e espera-se o único e derradeiro, no qual a própria chefia do governo e do Estado se apresenta como o fator de ruptura na normalidade democrática e da quebra de padrões institucionais, sem a conivência das FFAA, mas tampouco com uma atitude de distanciamento crítico que seria de se esperar de comandantes comprometidos com a manutenção de um ambiente de plena vigência do Estado de Direito: as ameaças atuais parte do chefe de Estado e comandante das FFAA, que invoca abusivamente o apoio de que supostamente dispõe nas corporações de defesa e de segurança do país, inclusive com sérias ameaças de quebra de disciplina e de hierarquia. Por algo menos do que isso, os militares se insurgiram em 1963-64, resultando no golpe militar que dividiu o país por mais de duas décadas. O país volta a estar dividido atualmente, e um pouco da responsabilidade incumbe claramente às FFAA. 

Não vejo, portanto, riscos imediatos de o Brasil resvalar para um governo autocrático, ou seja, uma ditadura aberta, em moldes tradicionais; o próprio regime militar, na sua longa duração de duas décadas, se encarregou de “vacinar” o Brasil contra novas incidências desse tipo. Mas é um fato que os últimos dois anos e meio de um desgoverno medíocre e caótico redundaram numa deterioração sensível de muitas das instituições de Estado, bem como da qualidade das políticas públicas de governo. Não existe nenhuma dúvida que o personagem nefasto que ocupa a cadeira presidencial gostaria de se ver dotado ou investido de poderes que a Constituição lhe veda, ou de exercer algum controle sobre as duas outras instituições de Estado, e suas agências especializadas. Entre estas, também é notório que as FFAA, de modo geral, mas o Exército em particular, se envolveram ou se deixaram envolver numa ação de apoio político (e até logístico, quando não eleitoral) que redundaram nessa deterioração institucional que já é evidente e perigosa. 

Os militares, em geral, e determinados setores em particular, atuaram em total contradição com os requerimentos de uma situação em completo descalabro financeiro, buscando e obtendo vantagens corporativas e pessoais que estão em nítido descompasso com o presente estado econômico do país e das contas públicas. O mais surpreendente é, justamente, a subserviência demonstrada em diversos episódios constrangedores aos olhos da opinião pública, quando não da ética e da moralidade política. Esse rebaixamento de padrões já se manifestou em pesquisas de opinião registrando a nítida diminuição e deterioração da imagem geralmente positiva que as FFAA tinham conquistado três décadas depois do final da ditadura militar, da qual elas saíram bastante chamuscadas em seu prestígio e imagem pública, quando não em sua qualidade técnica a serviço da nação. 

Assim como o presente desgoverno não tem precedentes em toda a história do país, não existem registros comparáveis quanto à imagem pública das FFAA, salvo em momentos de comoção política mais forte: revoltas tenentistas do início do século XX, golpe do Estado Novo e implantação de uma feroz ditadura, novamente golpe militar em 1964, com episódios sombrios que mancharam a honra e a reputação das Forças e de seus integrantes – envolvidos em casos de torturas, assassinatos, desaparecimentos, arbítrio e violência, atos de crueldade e de desumanidade raramente vistos em nossa história – e inclusive colocaram certos setores das FFAA numa situação de rompimento com o Estado de Direito e com preceitos claros de natureza constitucional. 

Mas, todos os episódios anteriores tinham um claro contexto de conflitos no próprio tecido social e no sistema político nacional. Atualmente, temos o primeiro exemplo histórico, e espera-se o único e derradeiro, no qual a própria chefia do governo e do Estado se apresenta como o fator de ruptura na normalidade democrática e da quebra de padrões institucionais, sem a conivência das FFAA, mas tampouco com uma atitude de distanciamento crítico que seria de se esperar de comandantes comprometidos com a manutenção de um ambiente de plena vigência do Estado de Direito: as ameaças atuais parte do chefe de Estado e comandante das FFAA, que invoca abusivamente o apoio de que supostamente dispõe nas corporações de defesa e de segurança do país, inclusive com sérias ameaças de quebra de disciplina e de hierarquia. Por algo menos do que isso, os militares se insurgiram em 1963-64, resultando no golpe militar que dividiu o país por mais de duas décadas. O país volta a estar dividido atualmente, e um pouco da responsabilidade incumbe claramente às FFAA. 


Brasília, 18/06/2021

domingo, 4 de abril de 2021

Vacinados contra o golpe - Fernando Gabeira

 

Vacinados contra o golpe. Por Fernando Gabeira

VACINADOS CONTRA O GOLPE

VACINADOS CONTRA O GOLPE

FERNANDO GABEIRA

Sociedade está reduzida a protestos virtuais. Mas cedo ou tarde julgaremos Bolsonaro



GUERRA DAS VACINAS


ARTIGO PUBLICADO ORIGINALMENTE EM O ESTADO DE S. PAULO
 E NO SITE DO AUTOR, www.gabeira.com.br, 
EDIÇÃO DE 2 DE ABRIL DE 2021

Enquanto os líderes mundiais lançavam um comunicado considerando a pandemia o maior problema da humanidade desde a 2ª Guerra, aqui, no Brasil, Bolsonaro quis dar um golpe para evitar o combate eficaz contra o coronavírus. Esta é a leitura que faço dos episódios da semana.

Bolsonaro pressionou o ministro da Defesa, Fernando Azevedo, não apenas para demitir o comandante do Exército, mas para ter condições de neutralizar pela força as medidas restritivas que os governadores impuseram em seus Estados para salvar vidas.

Com a demissão do ministro, os comandantes das Três Armas renunciaram em protesto contra Bolsonaro. E ficou evidente ali que o Exército não se lançaria na aventura de Bolsonaro, que, em nome da economia, tinha o potencial de matar mais ainda uma população já devastada pelo coronavírus.

A divergência entre a visão do Exército e a de Bolsonaro sobre a pandemia ficou evidente na véspera da demissão do ministro Fernando Azevedo, que ao sair se limitou a dizer que manteve a instituição militar como força do Estado, e não de um governo.

Em entrevista ao Correio Braziliense, o general Paulo Sérgio, diretor do Departamento de Pessoal do Exército, mostrou como a instituição atravessou a pandemia, obedecendo os mais estritos protocolos de segurança. Previdente, como, aliás, o são todos os governos do mundo, o Exército já se preparava para uma terceira onda. O saldo do combate, na proteção de 700 mil pessoas sob sua influência, foi muito positivo. Basta comparar o índice de mortalidade na Força, que foi de 0,13%, com o do Brasil, 2,5%.

Apesar de ter processado milhares de comprimidos de hidroxicloroquina em seus laboratórios, por influência de Bolsonaro, o Exército internamente comportou-se como grande parte da humanidade, tentando seguir protocolos de segurança. Houve também a passagem desastrosa do general Pazuello pelo Ministério da Saúde. Mas no seu pronunciamento o comandante Edson Pujol ressaltou que a ida de militares para o governo era uma escolha pessoal.

A posição de Pujol a respeito da pandemia pareceu inequívoca no seu documentado encontro com Bolsonaro em Porto Alegre. Bolsonaro estendeu a mão, Pujol ofereceu o cotovelo, que é o tipo de saudação recomendado pela OMS.

Lembro-me, naquele momento, de que escrevi sobre as ligações originárias das Forças Armadas com o positivismo, o que deve ter despertado nos militares não só um respeito, mas também uma disposição de associar seu trabalho à ciência.

Felizmente, a tentativa de envolver os militares na aventura macabra de sabotar pela força as medidas contra a pandemia fracassou. Mas Bolsonaro tinha um plano B.

Ele sabe que a instituição é mais sólida do que as PMs e logo em seguida pôs o plano em prática. Por intermédio de um deputado, tentou aprovar com urgência um projeto de mobilização nacional, que lhe daria controle de todas as PMs do Brasil. Tudo indica que ele busca desesperadamente uma força militar para impor suas ideias acerca da pandemia, uma força de intimidação dos adversários ancorados no bom senso.

Fora essa tentativa desastrada de dar um golpe para aplicar sua política de morte, Bolsonaro fez uma minirreforma ministerial, que apenas colocou o Centrão dentro do palácio, com a chave do cofre, e renovou algumas indicações familiares para cargos decisivos, como, por exemplo, o Ministério das Relações Exteriores. Poucos se lembram de que o início da crise era a pressão do Senado para derrubar o pior chanceler da nossa História, Ernesto Araújo.

Araújo apenas teorizava as ideias toscas de Bolsonaro com tintas de Steve Bannon, Olavo de Carvalho e da própria Alt Right americana. O foco do nosso isolamento internacional, diria mesmo de nossa vergonha, é o comportamento do presidente Bolsonaro, que fez do Brasil uma ameaça internacional, pela destruição ambiental e pela tragédia sanitária.

Ao escolher um modesto diplomata, que jamais ocupou uma embaixada, Bolsonaro quer mantê-lo agradecido pelo cargo e aberto à sua influência – mais precisamente, à influência do filho Eduardo, um dos grandes artífices da nossa destruidora política externa.

Bolsonaro enfrenta essa crise profunda num momento em que as próprias condições de governabilidade se diluem. Uma clara demonstração disso foi o Orçamento aprovado no Congresso. Sempre se diz que o Orçamento no Brasil é uma peça de ficção. Mas este, que foi aprovado com uma hipertrofia dos gastos militares, talvez esteja mais para um filme de horror.

Não se trata apenas de governabilidade num momento qualquer, mas durante uma pandemia de que o Brasil é o epicentro mundial, campeão indiscutível em número de mortos.

Um presidente incapaz, entregue no campo político à voracidade dos seus aliados do Centrão, buscando de todas as maneiras sabotar a luta contra a pandemia – tudo isso compõe um cenário desolador, sobretudo porque a sociedade está reduzida, no momento, a protestos virtuais.

Cedo ou tarde, julgaremos Bolsonaro.


Fernando Gabeira*– é escritor, jornalista e ex-deputado federal pelo Rio de Janeiro. Atualmente na GloboNews, como comentarista especial. Foi candidato ao Governo do Rio de Janeiro. Articulista para, entre outros veículos, O Estado de S. Paulo e O Globo, onde escreve às segundas.

terça-feira, 30 de março de 2021

Ordem do Dia Alusiva ao 31 de março de 1964 - novo ministro da defesa (com D minúsculo) dá tratos à bola no texto

 Os militares foram compelidos a comemorar o 31 de março por quem vocês sabem...

Na versão deles, nunca existiu golpe, só movimento para salvar o Brasil do comunismo. Seria até gozado, se não fosse ridículo...

Paulo Roberto de Almeida

MINISTÉRIO DA DEFESA
Ordem do Dia Alusiva ao 31 de março de 1964

Brasília, DF, 31 de março de 2021

Eventos ocorridos há 57 anos, assim como todo acontecimento histórico, só podem ser compreendidos a partir do contexto da época.

O século XX foi marcado por dois grandes conflitos bélicos mundiais e pela expansão de ideologias totalitárias, com importantes repercussões em todos os países.

Ao fim da Segunda Guerra Mundial, o mundo, contando com a significativa participação do Brasil, havia derrotado o nazi-fascismo. O mapa geopolítico internacional foi reconfigurado e novos vetores de força disputavam espaço e influência.

A Guerra Fria envolveu a América Latina, trazendo ao Brasil um cenário de inseguranças com grave instabilidade política, social e econômica. Havia ameaça real à paz e à democracia.

Os brasileiros perceberam a emergência e se movimentaram nas ruas, com amplo apoio da imprensa, de lideranças políticas, das igrejas, do segmento empresarial, de diversos setores da sociedade organizada e das Forças Armadas, interrompendo a escalada conflitiva, resultando no chamado movimento de 31 de março de 1964.

As Forças Armadas acabaram assumindo a responsabilidade de pacificar o País, enfrentando os desgastes para reorganizá-lo e garantir as liberdades democráticas que hoje desfrutamos.

Em 1979, a Lei da Anistia, aprovada pelo Congresso Nacional, consolidou um amplo pacto de pacificação a partir das convergências próprias da democracia. Foi uma transição sólida, enriquecida com a maturidade do aprendizado coletivo. O País multiplicou suas capacidades e mudou de estatura.

O cenário geopolítico atual apresenta novos desafios, como questões ambientais, ameaças cibernéticas, segurança alimentar e pandemias. As Forças Armadas estão presentes, na linha de frente, protegendo a população.

A Marinha, o Exército e a Força Aérea acompanham as mudanças, conscientes de sua missão constitucional de defender a Pátria, garantir os Poderes constitucionais, e seguros de que a harmonia e o equilíbrio entre esses Poderes preservarão a paz e a estabilidade em nosso País.

O movimento de 1964 é parte da trajetória histórica do Brasil. Assim devem ser compreendidos e celebrados os acontecimentos daquele 31 de março.


WALTER SOUZA BRAGA NETTO
Ministro de Estado da Defesa

segunda-feira, 18 de janeiro de 2021

De quem são as Forças Armadas - José Eduardo Faria (Estado da Arte)

 Política 

De quem são as Forças Armadas?

José Eduardo Faria

José Eduardo Faria é Professor Titular do Departamento de Filosofia e Teoria Geral do Direito da Faculdade de Direito da Universidade de São Paulo (USP). É professor da Fundação Getulio Vargas (FGV-Direito) e um dos ganhadores do Prêmio Jabuti (Direito) em 2012, além de Prêmios Esso de Jornalismo (1974 e 1976).

quinta-feira, 4 de junho de 2020

Um apelo para que NÃO se façam manifestações neste fim de semana - Luiz Eduardo Soares

LUIZ EDUARDO SOARES APELA QUE MOVIMENTOS SOCIAIS NÃO PROTESTEM NESTE MOMENTO: ‘É O QUE BOLSONARO ESPERA’

Sociólogo afirmou que há risco de infiltrados promoverem quebra-quebra
Um texto publicado nesta tarde pelo sociólogo Luiz Eduardo Soares no Facebook está correndo feito rastilho de pólvora entre a esquerda. Nele, Soares apela para que os movimentos sociais não vão às ruas neste momento, diante do risco de que infiltrados promovam quebra-quebra, com o objetivo de causar uma situação de caos social que crie o ambiente para Bolsonaro propor uma ruptura institucional.
Soares lembra da justificativa do uso das Forças Armadas para conter uma situação de caos social e desenha o cenário em que Bolsonaro usaria isso para, em nome da lei e da ordem, decretar o estado de sítio.
Eis o texto:
"Faço um apelo a todas e todos que sabem o que significaria um golpe policial-militar, sob liderança fascista. Os sinais são assustadores, ostensivos e crescentes. Hoje, o vice-presidente publicou um artigo absurdo e ameaçador no Estadão. Aras, embora tenha se corrigido depois, disse ao Bial que as Forças Armadas poderiam, sim, intervir se um poder invadisse a seara do outro, numa clara alusão crítica ao Supremo. Ives Gandra está a postos para escrever a justificativa "constitucional" do golpe. Nunca faltaram juristas aos generais; não faltarão ao capitão. Eduardo Bolsonaro confirmou: a ruptura está decidida, espera-se apenas a oportunidade. O presidente sobrevoou manifestação contra o Supremo e o Congresso ao lado do ministro da Defesa. Precisa desenhar?
Enquanto isso, do lado de cá, uns e outros estão melindrados com manifestos conclamando à união pela democracia. Questionam suas intenções e origens. Não querem ser usados por adversários que buscam se redimir de erros passados. Ou seja, perderam conexão com a realidade. O fogo já começou a lamber seus pés. Despertem, cacete!
Nessa conjuntura, movimentos sociais planejam manifestações para domingo. Pois aqui vai meu apelo. Companheiras e companheiros, vocês não percebem que Bolsonaro está armando uma armadilha? Vocês acham que terão condições de impedir que infiltrados promovam quebra-quebra? Não terão. Não subestimem os fascistas. A P2 fez isso outras vezes, por que não faria agora? Agitadores fascistas são profissionais da destruição. Sabem como gerar o que os bolsonaristas e a mídia chamarão "caos", sabem como reencenar o que a mídia gosta de denominar "vandalismo".
Se vocês forem às ruas, por mais organizados que estejam, não conseguirão impedir que provocadores façam o que Bolsonaro espera desde a posse. Se vocês forem às ruas, e eu adoraria que fossem e eu estaria junto com vocês, em condições normais, não só vão ajudar a propagar o vírus em nossos grupos, como vão oferecer a oportunidade que os fascistas aguardam, ansiosamente, e que têm sistematicamente estimulado.
Se isso ocorrer no próximo domingo, à noite, em rede de TV e rádio, Bolsonaro dirá que, em defesa da lei e da ordem, e "da democracia", enviará na manhã seguinte solicitação ao congresso para a decretação do estado de sítio. Se não houver apoio, o "poder moderador" das Forças Armadas se imporá, porque, afinal de contas, "Brasil acima de todos, Deus acima de tudo". Interventores, com apoio das polícias estaduais, tomarão o poder nos estados. Em lugar do Supremo, uma corte de exceção será nomeada.
Nessa noite tão tenebrosa quanto previsível, as lideranças sociais e políticas não alinhadas ao fascismo serão alvo de diferentes tipos de ação. Prefiro não descrevê-las. E só então quem, à esquerda, costuma desdenhar da "democracia formal" e de uma "Constituição que nunca chegou às classes subalternas ou aos territórios vulneráveis" vai entender que faz diferença, sim, o regime político, a tal democracia, por mais limitada e precária que seja, no Brasil.
Vocês acham que eu exagero? Estou paranoico? A quarentena me fez mal? Tomara que estejam certos. Entretanto, creio ser, hoje, um dever de todos e todas, especialmente das lideranças, alertar e explicar com detalhes o que está em jogo e quais são os riscos de realizar manifestações nesse momento. Só faz sentido ir para o confronto se a correlação de forças permitir, ou poderemos sofrer uma derrota histórica, um banho de sangue e um golpe. A menos que nossos companheiros tenham certeza de que conseguirão bloquear os sabotadores e provocadores a serviço do fascismo. Mas quem poderia ter essa certeza? Que líder responsável poderia ter essa certeza?"

quarta-feira, 24 de agosto de 2016

Golpe militar de 1964 no Brasil: mais documentos dos EUA - NSArchives

Continuando a postagem de alguns documentos relevantes para nossa própria história.
Paulo Roberto de Almeida
LBJ Library Photo by Yoichi Okamoto (Image Number: W1-20)
BRAZIL MARKS 40th ANNIVERSARY OF MILITARY COUP

DECLASSIFIED DOCUMENTS SHED LIGHT ON U.S. ROLE
Audio tape: President Johnson urged taking "every step that we can" to support overthrow of Joao Goulart
U.S. Ambassador Requested Pre-positioned Armaments to aid Golpistas; Acknowledged covert operations backing street demonstrations, civic forces and resistance groups
Edited by Peter Kornbluh
peter.kornbluh@gmail.com / 202 994-7116
Washington D.C., 31 March 2004 - "I think we ought to take every step that we can, be prepared to do everything that we need to do," President Johnson instructed his aides regarding preparations for a coup in Brazil on March 31, 1964. On the 40th anniversary of the military putsch, the National Security Archive today posted recently declassified documents on U.S. policy deliberations and operations leading up to the overthrow of the Goulart government on April 1, 1964. The documents reveal new details on U.S. readiness to back the coup forces.
The Archive's posting includes a declassified audio tape of Lyndon Johnson being briefed by phone at his Texas ranch, as the Brazilian military mobilized against Goulart. "I'd put everybody that had any imagination or ingenuity…[CIA Director John] McCone…[Secretary of Defense Robert] McNamara" on making sure the coup went forward, Johnson is heard to instruct undersecretary of State George Ball. "We just can't take this one," the tape records LBJ's opinion. "I'd get right on top of it and stick my neck out a little."
Among the documents are Top Secret cables sent by U.S. Ambassador Lincoln Gordon who forcefully pressed Washington for direct involvement in supporting coup plotters led by Army Chief of Staff General Humberto Castello Branco. "If our influence is to be brought to bear to help avert a major disaster here-which might make Brazil the China of the 1960s-this is where both I and all my senior advisors believe our support should be placed," Gordon wrote to high State Department, White House and CIA officials on March 27, 1964.
To assure the success of the coup, Gordon recommended "that measures be taken soonest to prepare for a clandestine delivery of arms of non-US origin, to be made available to Castello Branco supporters in Sao Paulo." In a subsequent cable, declassified just last month, Gordon suggested that these weapons be "pre-positioned prior any outbreak of violence," to be used by paramilitary units and "friendly military against hostile military if necessary." To conceal the U.S. role, Gordon recommended the arms be delivered via "unmarked submarine to be off-loaded at night in isolated shore spots in state of Sao Paulo south of Santos."
Gordon's cables also confirm CIA covert measures "to help strengthen resistance forces" in Brazil. These included "covert support for pro-democracy street rallies…and encouragement [of] democratic and anti-communist sentiment in Congress, armed forces, friendly labor and student groups, church, and business." Four days before the coup, Gordon informed Washington that "we may be requesting modest supplementary funds for other covert action programs in the near future." He also requested that the U.S. send tankers carrying "POL"-petroleum, oil and lubricants-to facilitate the logistical operations of the military coup plotters, and deploy a naval task force to intimidate Goulart's backers and be in position to intervene militarily if fighting became protracted.
Although the CIA is widely known to have been involved in covert action against Goulart leading up to the coup, its operational files on intervention in Brazil remain classified-to the consternation of historians. Archive analyst Peter Kornbluh called on the Agency to "lift the veil of secrecy off one of the most important episodes of U.S. intervention in the history of Latin America" by completely declassifying the record of CIA operations in Brazil. Both the Clinton and Bush administrations conducted significant declassifications on the military regimes in Chile and Argentina, he noted. "Declassification of the historical record on the 1964 coup and the military regimes that followed would advance U.S. interests in strengthening the cause of democracy and human rights in Brazil, and in the rest of Latin America," Kornbluh said.

On March 31, the documents show, Gordon received a secret telegram from Secretary of State Dean Rusk stating that the Administration had decided to immediately mobilize a naval task force to take up position off the coast of Brazil; dispatch U.S. Navy tankers "bearing POL" from Aruba; and assemble an airlift of 110 tons of ammunition and other equipment including "CS agent"-a special gas for mob control. During an emergency White House meeting on April 1, according to a CIA memorandum of conversation, Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara told President Johnson that the task force had already set sail, and an Esso tanker with motor and aviation gasoline would soon be in the vicinity of Santos. An ammunition airlift, he reported, was being readied in New Jersey and could be sent to Brazil within 16 hours.
Such U.S. military support for the military coup proved unnecessary; Castello Branco's forces succeeded in overthrowing Goulart far faster and with much less armed resistance then U.S. policy makers anticipated. On April 2, CIA agents in Brazil cabled that "Joao Goulart, deposed president of Brazil, left Porto Alegre about 1pm local time for Montevideo."
The documents and cables refer to the coup forces as "the democratic rebellion." After General Castello Branco's takeover, the military ruled Brazil until 1985.

Note: Documents are in PDF format. You will need to download and install the free Adobe Acrobat Reader to view.
Hear/Read the Documents
l) White House Audio Tape, President Lyndon B. Johnson discussing the impending coup in Brazil with Undersecretary of State George Ball, March 31, 1964
This audio clip is available in several formats:
Windows Media Audio - High bandwidth (7.11 MB)
Windows Media Audio - Low bandwidth (3.57 MB)
MP3 - (4.7 MB)

In this 5:08 minute White House tape obtained from the Lyndon Baines Johnson Library, President Johnson is recorded speaking on the phone from his Texas ranch with Undersecretary of State George Ball and Assistant Secretary for Latin America, Thomas Mann. Ball briefs Johnson on that status of military moves in Brazil to overthrow the government of Joao Goulart who U.S. officials view as a leftist closely associated with the Brazilian Communist Party. Johnson gives Ball the green light to actively support the coup if U.S. backing is needed. "I think we ought to take every step that we can, be prepared to do everything that we need to do" he orders. In an apparent reference to Goulart, Johnson states "we just can't take this one." "I'd get right on top of it and stick my neck out a little," he instructs Ball.
2) State Department, Top Secret Cable from Rio De Janiero, March 27, 1964
Ambassador Lincoln Gordon wrote this lengthy, five part, cable to the highest national security officers of the U.S. government, including CIA director John McCone and the Secretaries of Defense and State, Robert McNamara and Dean Rusk. He provides an assessment that President Goulart is working with the Brazilian Communist Party to "seize dictatorial power" and urges the U.S. to support the forces of General Castello Branco. Gordon recommends "a clandestine delivery of arms" for Branco's supporters as well as a shipment of gas and oil to help the coup forces succeed and suggests such support will be supplemented by CIA covert operations. He also urges the administration to "prepare without delay against the contingency of needed overt intervention at a second stage."
3) State Department, Top Secret Cable from Amb. Lincoln Gordon, March 29, 1964
Ambassador Gordon updates high U.S. officials on the deterioration of the situation in Brazil. In this cable, declassified on February 24, 2004 by the LBJ Presidential Library, he reiterates the "manifold" need to have a secret shipment of weapons "pre-positioned prior any outbreak of violence" to be "used by paramilitary units working with Democratic Military groups" and recommends a public statement by the administration "to reassure the large numbers of democrats in Brazil that we are not indifferent to the danger of a Communist revolution here."
4) CIA, Intelligence Information Cable on "Plans of Revolutionary Plotters in Minas Gerias," March 30, 1964
The CIA station in Brazil transmitted this field report from intelligence sources in Belo Horizonte that bluntly stated "a revolution by anti-Goulart forces will definitely get under way this week, probably in the next few days. The cable transmits intelligence on military plans to "march toward Rio." The "revolution," the intelligence source predicted, "will not be resolved quickly and will be bloody."
5) State Department, Secret Cable to Amb. Lincoln Gordon in Rio, March 31, 1964
Secretary of State Dean Rusk sends Gordon a list of the White House decisions "taken in order [to] be in a position to render assistance at appropriate time to anti-Goulart forces if it is decided this should be done." The decisions include sending US naval tankers loaded with petroleum, oil and lubricants from Aruba to Santos, Brazil; assembling 110 tons of ammunition and other equipment for pro-coup forces; and dispatching a naval brigade including an aircraft carrier, several destroyers and escorts to conduct be positioned off the coast of Brazil. Several hours later, a second cable is sent amending the number of ships, and dates they will be arriving off the coast.
6) CIA, Secret Memorandum of Conversation on "Meeting at the White House 1 April 1964 Subject-Brazil," April 1, 1964
This memorandum of conversation records a high level meeting, held in the White House, between President Johnson and his top national security aides on Brazil. CIA deputy chief of Western Hemisphere operations, Desmond Fitzgerald recorded the briefing given to Johnson and the discussion on the progress of the coup. Defense Secretary reported on the movements of the naval task force sailing towad Brazil, and the arms and ammunition being assembled in New Jersey to resupply the coup plotters if necessary.
7) CIA, Intelligence Information Cable on "Departure of Goulart from Porto Alegre for Montevideo," April 2, 1964
The CIA station in Brazil reports that the deposed president, Joao Goulart, left Brazil for exile in Uruguay at l pm, on April 2. His departure marks the success of the military coup in Brazil.

Brasil 1962-1964: documentos americanos sobre o processo politico nos anos Goulart - Dept. State, CIA, etc.

Graças a meu amigo James Herschberg, e ao embaixador Rubens Ricupero, minha atenção foi despertada para este conjunto de documentos americanos, referenciados abaixo, com uma ênfase na dramática conversação entre Robert Kennedy, enviado especial do seu irmão, presidente John F. Kennedy, e o presidente João Goulart. 
O relato foi feito pelo embaixador Lincoln Gordon, uma vez que nenhum outro interlocutor brasileiro esteve presente, sequer como "note taker" (Goulart não queria testemunhas brasileiros, talvez por desconfiar do Itamaraty, ou por não desejar que nenhum outro brasileiro ouvisse o que ele iria dizer, sinceramente ou não, ao enviado especial, já num processo de desgaste inevitável de Goulart junto aos americanos).
O National Security Archive, projeto mantido pela George Washington University, mantém dezenas, centenas, milhares de documentos como estes, liberados pelas autoridades americanos, ou a pedido do NSA, usando o FOIA (Freedom of Information Act).
Aproveitem. Todos os links estão devidamente transcritos por inteiro.
Paulo Roberto de Almeida 



Brazil Marks 50th Anniversary of Military Coup
On 50th anniversary, Archive posts new Kennedy Tape Transcripts on coup plotting against Brazilian President Joao Goulart
Robert Kennedy characterized Goulart as a "wily politician" who "figures he's got us by the ---."
Declassified White House records chart genesis of regime change effort in Brazil
National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 465
Posted April 2, 2014
Edited by James G. Hershberg and Peter Kornbluh
For more information contact:
James G. Hershberg, 202/302-5718
Peter Kornbluh, 202/374-7281

nsarchiv@gwu.edu

Washington, DC, April 2, 2014 Almost two years before the April 1, 1964, military takeover in Brazil, President Kennedy and his top aides began seriously discussing the option of overthrowing Joao Goulart's government, according to Presidential tape transcripts posted by the National Security Archive on the 50th anniversary of the coup d'tat. "What kind of liaison do we have with the military?" Kennedy asked top aides in July 1962. In March 1963, he instructed them: "We've got to do something about Brazil."
The tape transcripts advance the historical record on the U.S. role in deposing Goulart — a record which remains incomplete half a century after he fled into exile in Uruguay on April 1, 1964. "The CIA's clandestine political destabilization operations against Goulart between 1961 and 1964 are the black hole of this history," according to the Archive's Brazil Documentation Project director, Peter Kornbluh, who called on the Obama administration to declassify the still secret intelligence files on Brazil from both the Johnson and Kennedy administrations.
Revelations on the secret U.S. role in Brazil emerged in the mid 1970s, when the Lyndon Johnson Presidential library began declassifying Joint Chiefs of Staff records on "Operation Brother Sam" — President Johnson's authorization for the U.S. military to covertly and overtly supply arms, ammunition, gasoline and, if needed, combat troops if the military's effort to overthrow Goulart met with strong resistance. On the 40th anniversary of the coup, the National Security Archive posted audio files of Johnson giving the green light for military operations to secure the success of the coup once it started.
"I think we ought to take every step that we can, be prepared to do everything that we need to do," President Johnson instructed his aides regarding U.S. support for a coup as the Brazilian military moved against Goulart on March 31, 1964.
But Johnson inherited his anti-Goulart, pro-coup policy from his predecessor, John F. Kennedy. Over the last decade, declassified NSC records and recently transcribed White House tapes have revealed the evolution of Kennedy's decision to create a coup climate and, when conditions permitted, overthrow Goulart if he did not yield to Washington's demand that he stop "playing" with what Kennedy called "ultra-radical anti-Americans" in Brazil's government. During White House meetings on July 30, 1962, and on March 8 and 0ctober 7, 1963, Kennedy's secret Oval Office taping system recorded the attitude and arguments of the highest U.S. officials as they strategized how to force Goulart to either purge leftists in his government and alter his nationalist economic and foreign policies or be forced out by a U.S.-backed putsch.
Indeed, the very first Oval Office meeting that Kennedy secretly taped, on July 30, 1962, addressed the situation in Brazil. "I think one of our important jobs is to strengthen the spine of the military," U.S. Ambassador Lincoln Gordon told the President and his advisor, Richard Goodwin. "To make clear, discreetly, that we are not necessarily hostile to any kind of military action whatsoever if it's clear that the reason for the military action is…[Goulart's] giving the country away to the...," "Communists," as the president finished his sentence. During this pivotal meeting, the President and his men decided to upgrade contacts with the Brazilian military by bringing in a new US military attaché-Lt. Col. Vernon Walters who eventually became the key covert actor in the preparations for the coup. "We may very well want them [the Brazilian military] to take over at the end of the year," Goodwin suggested, "if they can." (Document 1)
By the end of 1962, the Kennedy administration had indeed determined that a coup would advance U.S. interests if the Brazilian military could be mobilized to move. The Kennedy White House was particularly upset about Goulart's independent foreign policy positions during the Cuban Missile Crisis. Although Goulart had assisted Washington's efforts to avoid nuclear Armageddon by acting as a back channel intermediary between Kennedy and Castro — a top secret initiative uncovered by George Washington University historian James G. Hershberg — Goulart was deemed insufficiently supportive of U.S. efforts to ostracize Cuba at the Organization of American States. On December 13, Kennedy told former Brazilian President Juscelino Kubitschek that the situation in Brazil "worried him more than that in Cuba."
On December 11, 1962, the Executive Committee (EXCOMM) of the National Security Council met to evaluate three policy alternatives on Brazil: A. "do nothing and allow the present drift to continue; B. collaborate with Brazilian elements hostile to Goulart with a view to bringing about his overthrow; C. seek to change the political and economic orientation of Goulart and his government." [link to document 2] Option C was deemed "the only feasible present approach" because opponents of Goulart lacked the "capacity and will to overthrow" him and Washington did not have "a near future U.S. capability to stimulate [a coup] operation successfully." Fomenting a coup, however "must be kept under active and continuous consideration," the NSC options paper recommended.
Acting on these recommendations, President Kennedy dispatched a special envoy — his brother Robert — to issue a face-to-face de facto ultimatum to Goulart. Robert Kennedy met with Goulart at the Palacio do Alvarada in Brazilia on December 17, 1962. During the three-hour meeting, RFK advised Goulart that the U.S. had "the gravest doubts" about positive future relations with Brazil, given the "signs of Communist or extreme left-wing nationalists infiltration into civilian government positions," and the opposition to "American policies and interests as a regular rule." As Goulart issued a lengthy defense of his policies, Kennedy passed a note to Ambassador Gordon stating: "We seem to be getting no place." The attorney general would later say that he came away from the meeting convinced that Goulart was "a Brazilian Jimmy Hoffa."
Kennedy and his top aides met once again on March 7, 1963, to decide how to handle the pending visit of the Brazilian finance minister, Santiago Dantas. In preparation for the meeting, Ambassador Gordon submitted a long memo to the president recommending that if it proved impossible to convince Goulart to modify his leftist positions, the U.S. work "to prepare the most promising possible environment for his replacement by a more desirable regime." (Document 5) The tape of this meeting (partially transcribed here for the first time by James Hershberg) focused on Goulart's continuing leftward drift. Robert Kennedy urged the President to be more forceful toward Goulart: He wanted his brother to make it plain "that this is something that's very serious with us, we're not fooling around about it, we're giving him some time to make these changes but we can't continue this forever." The Brazilian leader, he continued, "struck me as the kind of wily politician who's not the smartest man in the world ... he figures that he's got us by the---and that he can play it both ways, that he can make the little changes, he can make the arrangements with IT&T and then we give him some money and he doesn't have to really go too far." He exhorted the president to "personally" clarify to Goulart that he "can't have the communists and put them in important positions and make speeches criticizing the United States and at the same time get 225-[2]50 million dollars from the United States. He can't have it both ways."
As the CIA continued to report on various plots against Goulart in Brazil, the economic and political situation deteriorated. When Kennedy convened his aides again on October 7, he wondered aloud if the U.S. would need to overtly depose Goulart: "Do you see a situation where we might be—find it desirable to intervene militarily ourselves?" The tape of the October 7 meeting — a small part of which was recently publicized by Brazilian journalist Elio Gaspari, but now transcribed at far greater length here by Hershberg — contains a detailed discussion of various scenarios in which Goulart would be forced to leave. Ambassador Gordon urged the president to prepare contingency plans for providing ammunition or fuel to pro-U.S. factions of the military if fighting broke out. "I would not want us to close our minds to the possibility of some kind of discreet intervention," Gordon told President Kennedy, "which would help see the right side win."
Under Gordon's supervision, over the next few weeks the U.S. embassy in Brazil prepared a set of contingency plans with what a transmission memorandum, dated November 22, 1963, described as "a heavy emphasis on armed intervention." Assassinated in Dallas on that very day, President Kennedy would never have the opportunity to evaluate, let alone implement, these options.
But in mid-March 1964, when Goulart's efforts to bolster his political powers in Brazil alienated his top generals, the Johnson administration moved quickly to support and exploit their discontent-and be in the position to assure their success. "The shape of the problem," National Security Advisor McGeorge Bundy told a meeting of high-level officials three days before the coup, "is such that we should not be worrying that the [Brazilian] military will react; we should be worrying that the military will not react."
"We don't want to watch Brazil dribble down the drain," the CIA, White House and State Department officials determined, according to the Top Secret meeting summary, "while we stand around waiting for the [next] election."


THE DOCUMENTS
Document 1: White House, Transcript of Meeting between President Kennedy, Ambassador Lincoln Gordon and Richard Goodwin, July 30, 1962. (Published in The Presidential Recordings of John F. Kennedy, The Great Crises, Volume One (W.W. Norton), edited by Timothy Naftali, October 2001.)
The very first Oval Office meeting ever secretly taped by President Kennedy took place on July 30, 1962 and addressed the situation in Brazil and what to do about its populist president, Joao Goulart. The recording — it was transcribed and published in book The Presidential Recordings of John F. Kennedy, The Great Crises, Volume One — captures a discussion between the President, top Latin America aide Richard Goodwin and U.S. Ambassador to Brazil Lincoln Gordon about beginning to set the stage for a future military coup in Brazil. The President and his men make a pivotal decision to appoint a new U.S. military attaché to become a liaison with the Brazilian military, and Lt. Col. Vernon Walters is identified. Walters later becomes the key covert player in the U.S. support for the coup. "We may very well want them [the Brazilian military] to take over at the end of the year," Goodwin suggests, "if they can."

Document 2: NSC, Memorandum, "U.S. Short-Term policy Toward Brazil," Secret, December 11, 1962
In preparation for a meeting of the Executive Committee (EXCOMM) of the National Security Council, the NSC drafted an options paper with three policy alternatives on Brazil: A. "do nothing and allow the present drift to continue; B. collaborate with Brazilian elements hostile to Goulart with a view to bringing about his overthrow; C. seek to change the political and economic orientation of Goulart and his government." Option C was deemed "the only feasible present approach" because opponents of Goulart lacked the "capacity and will to overthrow" him and Washington did not have "a near future U.S. capability to stimulate [a coup] operation successfully." Fomenting a coup, however "must be kept under active and continuous consideration," the NSC options paper recommended. If Goulart continued to move leftward, "the United States should be ready to shift rapidly and effectively to…collaboration with friendly democratic elements, including the great majority of military officer corps, to unseat President Goulart."
 
Document 3: NSC, "Minutes of the National Security Council Executive Committee Meeting, Meeting No. 35," Secret, December 11, 1962
The minutes of the EXCOMM meeting record that President Kennedy accepted the recommendation that U.S. policy "seek to change the political and economic orientation of Goulart and his government."

Document 4: U.S. Embassy, Rio de Janeiro, Airgram A-710, "Minutes of Conversation between Brazilian President Joao Goulart and Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy, Brasilia, 17 December 1962," December 19, 1962
In line with JFK's decision at the Excom meeting on December 11 to have "representative sent specially" to talk to Goulart, the president's brother made a hastily-prepared journey to "confront" the Brazilian leader over the issues that had increasingly concerned and irritated Washington-from his chaotic management of Brazil's economy and expropriation of U.S. corporations such as IT&T, to his lukewarm support during the Cuban missile crisis and flirtation with the Soviet bloc to, most alarming, his allegedly excessive toleration of far left and even communist elements in the government, military, society, and even his inner circle. Accompanied by US ambassador Lincoln Gordon, RFK met for more than three hours with Goulart in the new inland capital of Brasília at the modernistic lakeside presidential residence, the Palácio do Alvorada. A 17-page memorandum of conversation, drafted by Amb. Gordon, recorded the Attorney General presenting his list of complaints: the "many signs of Communist or extreme left-wing nationalists infiltration" into civilian government, military, trade union, and student group leaderships, and Goulart's personal failure to take a public stand against the "violently anti-American" statements emanating from "influential Brazilians" both in and out of his government, or to embrace Kennedy's Alliance for Progress. Turning to economic issues, he said his brother was "very deeply worried at the deterioration" in recent months, from rampant inflation to the disappearance of reserves, and called on Goulart to get his "economic and financial house in order." Surmounting these obstacles to progress, RFK stressed, could mark a "turning point in relations between Brazil and the U.S. and in the whole future of Latin America and of the free world." When Goulart defended his policies, Kennedy scribbled a note to Ambassador Gordon: "We seem to be getting no place." JFK's emissary voiced his fear "that President Goulart had not fully understood the nature of President Kennedy's concern about the present situation and prospects."
 
Document 5: Department of State, Memorandum to Mr. McGeorge Bundy, "Political Considerations Affecting U.S. Assistance to Brazil," Secret, March 7, 1963
In preparation for another key Oval office meeting on Brazil, the Department of State transmitted two briefing papers, including a memo to the president from Amb. Gordon titled "Brazilian Political Developments and U.S. Assistance." The latter briefing paper (attached to the first document) was intended to assist the President in deciding how to handle the visit of Brazilian Finance Minister San Tiago Dantas to Washington. Gordon cited continuing problems with Goulart's "equivocal, with neutralist overtones" foreign policy, and the "communist and other extreme nationalist, far left wing, and anti-American infiltration in important civilian and military posts with the government."
 
Document 6: Excerpts from John F. Kennedy's conversation regarding Brazil with U.S. Ambassador to Brazil Lincoln Gordon on Friday March 8, 1963 (Meeting 77.1, President's Office Files, John F. Kennedy Presidential Library, Boston)
On March 8, 1963, a few days before Dantas' arrived, JFK reviewed the state of US-Brazilian relations with his top advisors, including Secretary of State Dean Rusk, his ambassador to Brazil, Lincoln Gordon, and his brother Robert. Unofficially transcribed here by James G. Hershberg (with assistance from Marc Selverstone and David Coleman) this is apparently the first time that it has been published since the tape recording was released more than a decade ago by the John F. Kennedy Presidential Library in Boston. As the comments by Rusk, Gordon, and RFK make clear, deep dissatisfaction with Goulart persisted. "Brazil is a country that we can't possibly turn away from," Secretary of State Rusk told the president. "Whatever happens there is going to be of decisive importance to the hemisphere." Rusk frankly acknowledged that the situation wasn't yet so bad as to justify Goulart's overthrow to "all the non-communists or non-totalitarian Brazilians," nor to justify a "clear break" between Washington and Rio that would be understood throughout the hemisphere. Instead, the strategy for the time being was to continue cooperation with Goulart's government while raising pressure on him to improve his behavior, particularly his tolerance of far-leftist, anti-United States, and even communist associates-to, in JFK's words, "string out" aid in order to "put the screws" on him. The president's brother, in particular, clearly did not feel that Goulart had followed through since their meeting a few months earlier on his vows to put a lid on anti-U.S. expressions or make personnel changes to remove some of the most egregiously leftist figures in his administration. Goulart, stated RFK, "struck me as the kind of wily politician who's not the smartest man in the world but very sensitive to this [domestic political] area, that he figures that he's got us by the---and that he can play it both ways, that he can make the little changes…and then we give him some money and he doesn't have to really go too far."

Document 7: CIA, Current Intelligence Memorandum, "Plotting Against Goulart," Secret, March 8, 1963
For more than two years before the April 1, 1964 coup, the CIA transmitted intelligence reports on various coup plots. The plot, described in this memo as "the best-developed plan," is being considered by former minister of war, Marshal Odylio Denys. In a clear articulation of U.S. concerns about the need for a successful coup, the CIA warned that "a premature coup effort by the Brazilian military would be likely to bring a strong reaction from Goulart and the cashiering of those officers who are most friendly to the United States."
 
Document 8: State Department, Latin American Policy Committee, "Approved Short-Term Policy in Brazil," Secret, October 3, 1963
In early October, the State Department's Latin America Policy Committee approved a "short term" draft policy statement on Brazil for consideration by President Kennedy and the National Security Council. Compared to the review in March, the situation has deteriorated drastically, according to Washington's point of view, in large measure due to Goulart's "agitation," unstable leadership, and increasing reliance on leftist forces. In its reading of the current and prospective situation, defining American aims, and recommending possible lines of action for the United States, the statement explicitly considered, albeit somewhat ambiguously, the U.S. attitude toward a possible coup to topple Goulart. "Barring clear indications of serious likelihood of a political takeover by elements subservient to and supported by a foreign government, it would be against U.S. policy to intervene directly or indirectly in support of any move to overthrow the Goulart regime. In the event of a threatened foreign-government-affiliated political takeover, consideration of courses of action would be directed more broadly but directly to the threatened takeover, rather than against Goulart (though some action against the latter might result)." Kennedy and his top aides met four days later to consider policy options and strategies--among them U.S. military intervention in Brazil.
 
Document 9: Excerpts from John F. Kennedy's conversation regarding Brazil with U.S. Ambassador to Brazil Lincoln Gordon on Monday, October 7, 1963 (tape 114/A50, President's Office Files, John F. Kennedy Presidential Library, Boston)
"Do you see a situation where we might be-find it desirable to intervene militarily ourselves?" John F. Kennedy's question to his ambassador to Brazil, Lincoln Gordon, reflected the growing concerns that a coup attempt against Goulart might need U.S. support to succeed, especially if it triggered an outbreak of fighting or even civil war. This tape, parts of which were recently publicized by Brazilian journalist Elio Gaspari, has been significantly transcribed by James G. Hershberg (with assistance from Marc Selverstone) and published here for the first time. It captured JFK, Gordon, Defense Secretary Robert S. McNamara and other top officials concluding that the prospect of an impending move to terminate Goulart's stay in office (long before his term was supposed to come to an end more than two years later) required an acceleration of serious U.S. military contingency planning as well as intense efforts to ascertain the balance between military forces hostile and friendly to the current government. In his lengthy analysis of the situation, Gordon — who put the odds at 50-50 that Goulart would be gone, one way or another, by early 1964 — outlined alternative scenarios for future developments, ranging from Goulart's peaceful early departure ("a very good thing for both Brazil and Brazilian-American relations"), perhaps eased out by military pressure, to a possible sharp Goulart move to the left, which could trigger a violent struggle to determine who would rule the country. Should a military coup seize power, Gordon clearly did not want U.S. squeamishness about constitutional or democratic niceties to preclude supporting Goulart's successors: "Do we suspend diplomatic relations, economic relations, aid, do we withdraw aid missions, and all this kind of thing — or do we somehow find a way of doing what we ought to do, which is to welcome this?" And should the outcome of the attempt to oust Goulart lead to a battle between military factions, Gordon urged study of military measures (such as providing fuel or ammunition, if requested) that Washington could take to assure a favorable outcome: "I would not want us to close our minds to the possibility of some kind of discreet intervention in such a case, which would help see the right side win." On the tape, McNamara suggests, and JFK approves, accelerated work on contingency planning ("can we get it really pushed ahead?"). Even as U.S. officials in Brazil intensified their encouragement of anti-communist military figures, Kennedy cautioned that they should not burn their bridges with Goulart, which might give him an excuse to rally nationalist support behind an anti-Washington swerve to the left: Washington needed to continue "applying the screws on the [economic] aid" to Brazil, but "with some sensitivity."
 
Document 10: State Department, Memorandum, "Embassy Contingency Plan," Top Secret, November 22, 1963
Dated on the day of President Kennedy's assassination in Dallas, this cover memo describes a new contingency plan from the U.S. Embassy in Brazil that places "heavy emphasis on U.S. armed intervention." The actual plan has not been declassified.
 
Document 11: NSC, Memcon, "Brazil," Top Secret, March 28, 1964
As the military prepared to move against Goulart, top CIA, NSC and State Department officials met to discuss how to support them. They evaluated a proposal, transmitted by Ambassador Gordon the previous day, calling for covert delivery of armaments and gasoline, as well as the positioning of a naval task force off the coast of Brazil. At this point, U.S. officials were not sure if or when the coup would take place, but made clear their interest in its success. "The shape of the problem," according to National Security Advisor McGeorge Bundy, "is such that we should not be worrying that the military will react; we should be worrying that the military will not react."

Document 12: U.S. Embassy, Brazil, Memo from Ambassador Gordon, Top Secret, March 29, 1964
Gordon transmitted a message for top national security officials justifying his requests for pre-positioning armaments that could be used by "para-military units" and calling for a "contingency commitment to overt military intervention" in Brazil. If the U.S. failed to act, Gordon warned, there was a "real danger of the defeat of democratic resistance and communization of Brazil."
 
Document 13: Joint Chiefs of Staff, Cable, [Military attaché Vernon Walters Report on Coup Preparations], Secret, March 30, 1964
U.S. Army attaché Vernon Walters meets with the leading coup plotters and reports on their plans. "It had been decided to take action this week on a signal to be issued later." Walters reported that he "expects to be aware beforehand of go signal and will report in consequence."

Document 14 (mp3): White House Audio Tape, President Lyndon B. Johnson discussing the impending coup in Brazil with Undersecretary of State George Ball, March 31, 1964.
 
Document 15: White House, Memorandum, "Brazil," Secret, April 1, 1964
As of 3:30 on April 1st, Ambassador Gordon reports that the coup is "95% over." U.S. contingency planning for overt and covert supplies to the military were not necessary. General Castello Branco "has told us he doesn't need our help. There was however no information about where Goulart had fled to after the army moved in on the palace.
 
Document 16: Central Intelligence Agency, Intelligence Cable, "Departure of Goulart from Porto Alegre for Montevideo," Secret, April 2, 1964
CIA intelligence sources report that deposed president Joao Goulart has fled to Montevideo.
================

Transcrição complete de um documento revelador:

Document 4: U.S. Embassy, Rio de Janeiro, Airgram A-710, "Minutes of Conversation between Brazilian President Joao Goulart and Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy, Brasilia, 17 December 1962," December 19, 1962
In line with JFK's decision at the Excom meeting on December 11 to have "representative sent specially" to talk to Goulart, the president's brother made a hastily-prepared journey to "confront" the Brazilian leader over the issues that had increasingly concerned and irritated Washington-from his chaotic management of Brazil's economy and expropriation of U.S. corporations such as IT&T, to his lukewarm support during the Cuban missile crisis and flirtation with the Soviet bloc to, most alarming, his allegedly excessive toleration of far left and even communist elements in the government, military, society, and even his inner circle. Accompanied by US ambassador Lincoln Gordon, RFK met for more than three hours with Goulart in the new inland capital of Brasília at the modernistic lakeside presidential residence, the Palácio do Alvorada. A 17-page memorandum of conversation, drafted by Amb. Gordon, recorded the Attorney General presenting his list of complaints: the "many signs of Communist or extreme left-wing nationalists infiltration" into civilian government, military, trade union, and student group leaderships, and Goulart's personal failure to take a public stand against the "violently anti-American" statements emanating from "influential Brazilians" both in and out of his government, or to embrace Kennedy's Alliance for Progress. Turning to economic issues, he said his brother was "very deeply worried at the deterioration" in recent months, from rampant inflation to the disappearance of reserves, and called on Goulart to get his "economic and financial house in order." Surmounting these obstacles to progress, RFK stressed, could mark a "turning point in relations between Brazil and the U.S. and in the whole future of Latin America and of the free world." When Goulart defended his policies, Kennedy scribbled a note to Ambassador Gordon: "We seem to be getting no place." JFK's emissary voiced his fear "that President Goulart had not fully understood the nature of President Kennedy's concern about the present situation and prospects."