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domingo, 13 de outubro de 2019

China: 70 anos do comunismo ao capitalismo de Estado -

Uma história factual dos 70 anos de comunismo na China.

The People’s Republic of China: 70 Years of Economic History

70 Years of China’s Economic Growth in One Chart

Chart: 70 Years of China’s Economic Growth

View a high-resolution version of this graphic here.
From agrarian economy to global superpower in half a century—China’s transformation has been an economic success story unlike any other.
Today, China is the world’s second largest economy, making up 16% of $86 trillion global GDP in nominal terms. If you adjust numbers for purchasing power parity (PPP), the Chinese economy has already been the world’s largest since 2014.
The upward trajectory over the last 70 years has been filled with watershed moments, strategic directives, and shocking tragedies — and all of this can be traced back to the founding of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) on October 1st, 1949.

How the PRC Came to Be

The Chinese Civil War (1927–1949) between the Republic of China (ROC) and the Communist Party of China (CPC) caused a fractal split in the nation’s leadership. The CPC emerged victorious, and mainland China was established as the PRC.
Communist leader Mao Zedong set out a few chief goals for the PRC: to overhaul land ownership, to reduce social inequality, and to restore the economy after decades of war. The first State Planning Commission and China’s first 5-year plan were introduced to achieve these goals.
Today’s timely chart looks back on seven decades of notable events and policies that helped shape the country China has become. The base data draws from a graphic by Bert Hofman, the World Bank’s Country Director for China and other Asia-Pacific regions.

The Mao Era: 1949–1977

Mao Zedong’s tenure as Chairman of the PRC triggered sweeping changes for the country.
1953–1957: First 5-Year Plan
The program’s aim was to boost China’s industrialization. Steel production grew four-fold in four years, from 1.3 million tonnes to 5.2 million tonnes. Agricultural output also rose, but it couldn’t keep pace with industrial production.
1958–1962: Great Leap Forward
The campaign emphasized China’s agrarian-to-industrial transformation, via a communal farming system. However, the plan failed—causing an economic breakdown and the deaths of tens of millions in the Great Chinese Famine.
1959–1962: Lushan Conference and 7,000 Cadres meeting
Top leaders in the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) met to create detailed policy frameworks for the PRC’s future.
1966–1976: Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution
Mao Zedong attempted to regain power and support after the failures of the Great Leap Forward. However, this was another plan that backfired, causing millions more deaths by violence and again crippling the Chinese economy.
1971: Joined the United Nations
The PRC replaced the ROC (Taiwan) as a permanent member of the United Nations. This addition also made it one of only five members of the UN Security Council—including the UK, the U.S., France, and Russia.
1972: President Nixon’s visit
After 25 years of radio silence, Richard Nixon was the first sitting U.S. President to step foot into the PRC. This helped re-establish diplomatic relations between the two nations.
1976–1977: Mao Zedong Death, and “Two Whatevers”
After Mao Zedong’s passing, the interim government promised to “resolutely uphold whatever policy decisions Chairman Mao made, and unswervingly follow whatever instructions Chairman Mao gave.”
1979: “One-Child Policy”
The government enacted an aggressive birth-planning program to control the size of the country’s population, which it viewed as growing too fast. 

A Wave of Socio-Economic Reforms: 1980-1999

From 1980 onward, China worked on opening up its markets to the outside world, and closing the inequality gap.
1980–1984: Special Economic Zones (SEZs) established
Several cities were designated SEZs, and provided with measures such as tax incentives to attract foreign investment. Today, the economies of cities like Shenzhen have grown to rival the GDPs of entire countries.
1981: National Household Responsibility System implemented
In the Mao era, quotas were set on how many goods farmers could produce, shifting the responsibility of profits to local managers instead. This rapidly increased the standard of living, and the quota system spread from agriculture into other sectors.
1989: Coastal Development Strategy
Post-Mao leadership saw the coastal region as the potential “catalyst” for the entire country’s modernization.
1989–1991: Post-Tiananmen retrenchment
Early 1980s economic reforms had mixed results, and the growing anxiety eventually culminated in a series of protests. After tanks rolled into Tiananmen Square in 1989, the government “retrenched” itself by initially attempting to roll back economic reforms and liberalization. The country’s annual growth plunged from 8.6% between 1979-1989 to 6.5% between 1989-1991.
1990–1991: Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges open
Combined, the Shanghai (SSE) and Shenzhen (SZSE) stock exchanges are worth over $8.5 trillion in total market capitalization today.
1994: Shandong Huaneng lists on the NYSE
The power company was the first PRC enterprise to list on the NYSE. This added a new N-shares group to the existing Chinese capital market options of A-shares, B-shares, and H-shares.
1994–1996: National “8-7” Poverty Reduction Plan
China successfully lifted over 400 million poor people out of poverty between 1981 and 2002 through this endeavor.
1996: “Grasp the Large, Let Go of the Small”
Efforts were made to downsize the state sector. Policy makers were urged to maintain control over state-owned enterprises to “grasp the large”. Meanwhile, the central government was encouraged to relinquish control over smaller SOEs, or “let go of the small”. 
1997: Urban Dibao (低保)
China’s social safety net went through restructuring from 1993, and became a nationwide program after strong success in Shanghai.
1997-1999: Hong Kong and Macao handover, Asian Financial Crisis
China was largely unscathed by the regional financial crisis, thanks to the RMB (¥) currency’s non-convertibility. Meanwhile, the PRC regained sovereignty of Hong Kong and Macau back from the UK and Portugal, respectively.
1999: Western Development Strategy
The “Open Up the West” program built out 6 provinces, 5 autonomous regions, and 1 municipality—each becoming integral to the Chinese economy.

Turn of the Century: 2000-present

China’s entry to the World Trade Organization, and the Qualified Foreign Institutional Investor (QFII) program – which let foreign investors participate in the PRC’s stock exchanges – contributed to the country’s economic growth.
Source: CNBC
2006: Medium-term Plan for Scientific Development
The PRC State Council’s 15-year plan outlines that 2.5% or more of national GDP should be devoted to research and development by 2020.
2008-2009: Global Financial Crisis
The PRC experienced only a mild economic slowdown during the crisis. The country’s GDP growth in 2007 was a staggering 14.2%, but this dropped to 9.7% and 9.5% respectively in the two years following.
2013: Belt and Road Initiative
China’s ambitious plans to develop road, rail, and sea routes across 152 countries is scheduled for completion by 2049—in time for the PRC’s 100th anniversary. More than $900 billion is budgeted for these infrastructure projects.
2015: Made in China 2025
The PRC refuses to be the world’s “factory” any longer. In response, it will invest nearly $300 billion to boost its manufacturing capabilities in high-tech fields like pharmaceuticals, aerospace, and robotics.
Despite the recent ongoing trade dispute with the U.S. and an increasingly aging population, the Chinese growth story seems destined to continue on.

China Paving the Way?

The 70th anniversary of the PRC offers a moment to reflect on the country’s journey from humble beginnings to a powerhouse on the world stage.
Because of China’s economic success, more and more countries see China as an example to emulate, a model of development that could mean moving from rags to riches within a generation.

This infographic explores how China’s proposed social credit system will monitor and surveil citizens, and how it’ll be used to reward or punish them.

Published
3 weeks ago
on
September 18, 2019
In an attempt to imbue trust, China has announced a plan to implement a national ranking system for its citizens and companies. Currently in pilot mode, the new system will be rolled out in 2020, and go through numerous iterations before becoming official. 
While the system may be a useful tool for China to manage its growing 1.4 billion population, it has triggered global concerns around the ethics of big data, and whether the system is a breach of fundamental human rights. 
Today’s infographic looks at how China’s proposed social credit system could work, and what the implications might be.

The Government is Always Watching

Currently, the pilot system varies from place to place, whereas the new system is envisioned as a unified system. Although the pilot program may be more of an experiment than a precursor, it gives a good indication of what to expect. 
In the pilot system, each citizen is assigned 1,000 points and is consistently monitored and rated on how they behave. Points are earned through good deeds, and lost for bad behavior. Users increase points by donating blood or money, praising the government on social media, and helping the poor. Rewards for such behavior can range from getting a promotion at work fast-tracked, to receiving priority status for children’s school admissions. 
In contrast, not visiting one’s aging parents regularly, spreading rumors on the internet, and cheating in online games are considered antisocial behaviors. Punishments include public shaming, exclusion from booking flights or train tickets, and restricted access to public services.

Big Data Goes Right to the Source

The perpetual surveillance that comes with the new system is expected to draw on huge amounts of data from a variety of traditional and digital sources. 
Police officers have used AI-powered smart glasses and drones to effectively monitor citizens. Footage from these devices showing antisocial behavior can be broadcast to the public to shame the offenders, and deter others from behaving similarly.
For more serious offenders, some cities in China force people to repay debts by switching the person’s ringtone without their permission. The ringtone begins with the sound of a police siren, followed by a message such as: 
“The person you are calling has been listed as a discredited person by the local court. Please urge this person to fulfill his or her legal obligations.”
Two of the largest companies in China, Tencent and Alibaba, were enlisted by the People’s Bank of China to play an important role in the credit system, raising the issue of third-party data security. WeChat—China’s largest social media platform, owned by Tencent—tracked behavior and ranked users accordingly, while displaying their location in real-time. 
Following data concerns, these tech companies—and six others—were not awarded any licenses by the government. However, social media giants are still involved in orchestrating the public shaming of citizens who misbehave.

The Digital Dang’an

The social credit system may not be an entirely new initiative in China. The dang’an (English: record) is a paper file containing an individual’s school reports, information on physical characteristics, employment records, and photographs. 
These dossiers, which were first used in the Maoist years, helped the government in maintaining control of its citizens. This gathering of citizen’s data for China’s social credit system may in fact be seen as a revival of the principle of dang’an in the digital era, with the system providing a powerful tool to monitor citizens whose data is more difficult to capture. 

Is the System Working?

In 2018, people with a low score were prohibited from buying plane tickets almost 18 million times, while high-speed train ticket transactions were blocked 5.5 million times. A further 128 people were prohibited from leaving China, due to unpaid taxes.
The system could have major implications for foreign business practices—as preference could be given to companies already ranked in the system. Companies with higher scores will be rewarded with incentives which include lower tax rates and better credit conditions, with their behavior being judged in areas such as:
  • Paid taxes
  • Customs regulation
  • Environmental protection
Despite the complexities of gathering vast amounts of data, the system is certainly making an impact. While there are benefits to having a standardized scoring system, and encouraging positive behavior—will it be worth the social cost of gamifying human life? 

A Timeline of U-Turns from the Chinese Market


It’s hard to ignore the massive economic opportunities available in the Chinese market, but it’s also notoriously difficult to succeed in.

Published
4 months ago
on
June 5, 2019
China’s economic surge is one of the biggest stories of the 21st century.
Hundreds of millions of people have been lifted out of poverty, and China’s swelling middle class has attracted the interest of Western companies.
As many American companies have discovered, doing business in China is far from straightforward. Recent history is littered with examples of companies that entered the Chinese market to great fanfare, only to retreat a few years later.

Calling Off The Offensive

Today’s infographic highlights 11 companies that ended up tapping the brakes on their ambitious forays on the other side of the Pacific.
Then, we take a look at the factors that influenced these strategic withdrawals.
Here are some high profile examples of corporate u-turns by American companies operating in the Chinese market:

Google

When Google China’s search engine was launched in 2006, the company had made the controversial decision to censor search results within the country. Google publicly displayed a disclaimer indicating that some results were removed, which created tensions with the Chinese government.
For a while, things seemed to be going well. Even though a domestic company, Baidu, had captured the majority of the Chinese search market, Google did have a respectable market share of about 30%.
Google China’s fortune took a turn for the worse in 2010 after a major hack – Operation Aurora – exposed user data as well as intellectual property. The hack, which originated from within China, was the last straw for Google’s executive team. After one last ditch effort to provide unfiltered search results within China, the company retreated beyond the firewall.

Amazon

Amazon was an early entrant into the Chinese market. In 2004, the company acquired Joyo – an online shopping site – which was eventually rebranded to Amazon China in 2011. 
Amazon China achieved some early success hitting a market share of around 15%, but today, that market share has eroded to less than 1%. Facing nearly insurmountable competition from domestic e-commerce platforms like JD and Taobao, the company recently announced it would be exiting the Chinese market.

Uber

After arriving fashionably late for the ride-hailing party in 2014, it quickly became clear that Uber was facing an uphill battle against well-funded domestic rivals. After only two years, Uber elected to u-turn out of the Chinese market.
Though Uber’s tactical exit from China is often viewed as a failure, the company has earned upwards of $8B through its sale to competitor Didi Chuxing.

A Two-Way Street

Now that red-hot growth at home is beginning to taper off, a number of Chinese companies have begun their push into other markets around the world. Much like their American counterparts, brands pushing beyond China’s borders are seeing varied success in their expansion efforts.
One high-profile example is Huawei. The telecommunications giant has been making inroads in countries around the world – particularly in emerging markets – but has seen pushback and scrutiny in a number of developed economies. Huawei has become a lightning rod for growing concerns over government surveillance and China’s growing influence over the global communications network.
Already, Australia has blocked the company from participating in its 5G network, and in the United States, government agencies are banned from buying Huawei gear.
If negative sentiment continues to build, it remains to be seen whether Huawei and other Chinese companies will follow the playbook of American brands in China, and turn the car around.

segunda-feira, 27 de junho de 2016

Educacao: progressos sociais do seculo 19 ao 21 - livro de Robert Barro, Jong-Wha Lee

Published by EH.Net (June 2016)

Robert J. Barro and Jong-Wha Lee, Education Matters: Global Schooling Gains from the 19th to the 21st Century. New York: Oxford University Press, 2015. xi + 289 pp. $35 (hardcover), ISBN: 978-0-19-937923-1.

Reviewed for EH.Net by Sun Go, School of Economics, Chung-Ang University.

Can we analyze the role of education in economic, political, and social development using cross-country panel data? Robert J. Barro (Paul M. Warburg Professor of Economics at Harvard University) and Jong-Wha Lee (Professor of Economics and the Director of the Asiatic Research Institute at Korea University) have long been studying this subject and have published numerous academic works on it for more than twenty years. Education Matters is a comprehensive volume of their contributions to the literature on human capital and development, compiled by creating and analyzing their own long-term panel data at the country level. The book is mainly composed of two parts. The first part (Chapters 2 and 3) explains how they created cross-country panel data on average school years, and projects the growth of educational attainment to 2040. The second part (Chapters 3, 4, and 5) presents their analysis of the panel data on the effect of educational attainment on growth, fertility, and political institutions. In Chapter 5, in particular, Barro and Lee create another set of educational attainment data considering the quality of schooling, and repeat their analysis using the new quality-adjusted data set.

A conspicuous contribution of Barro and Lee is the creation of the cross-county educational attainment data sets. They first collect 146 countries’ enrollment rates of school-age population at the elementary, secondary, and tertiary levels at five-year intervals from 1950 to 2010. Most of the enrollment data are collected from UNESCO statistics based on each country’s census reports. By applying school-entering ages, term lengths, and the dropout rates to the enrollment rates by year and country, they compute the average years of schooling of the young cohorts, such as the 15 to 19 or the 20 to 24 year-old population. The average years of schooling for the older cohorts are estimated by applying cohort and education-level specific mortality rates to the educational attainment of younger cohorts under the assumption of no adult education. Finally, the educational attainment of the working population of a country for a year are calculated by the average years of schooling of the five-year-interval birth cohorts weighted by their population sizes. In addition to the total educational attainment data, Barro and Lee also estimate country-level educational attainment by sex. This is the baseline data that they have created and updated since the 1990s.

The book introduces another historical panel of educational attainment at the country level from 1870 to 1945, which is constructed in a similar way. The starting point is again a collection of the enrollment rates at elementary, secondary, and tertiary levels of 89 countries from 1820 to 2010 at five-year intervals. They calculate the enrollment rates using various historical statistics of school enrollments and school-age populations. Historical enrollment statistics are compiled from diverse sources such as Databanks International, Mitchell’s International Historical Statistics, Benavot and Riddle (1988), Lindert (2004), U.S. Bureau of Education’s Annual/Biannual Reports, Barnard (1854), and Monroe (1911). School-age population statistics are collected from Mitchell’s International Historical Statistics, the United Nations’ Demographic Yearbooks, and the League of Nation’s Statistical Yearbooks. However, due to the limited availability of historical enrollment data, a portion of the enrollment rates are created by linear interpolation or estimation assuming a logistic trend. About 38 percent of the school enrollment rates of total population from 1870 to 1945 are either interpolated or estimated. The share of the artificial data is greater for the female population and the period before 1870. Using the historical enrollment rates, Barro and Lee estimate the historical data on educational attainment by sex in a similar way to their baseline data for 1950-2010.

The two data sets are freely downloadable from the authors’ webpage (http://www.barrolee.com). The baseline data on educational attainment from 1950 to 2010 have already been widely used by researchers in social sciences, and their unique historical panel is expected to attract the interests of scholars. The historical panel will be useful in capturing long-run trends and examining over-time correlation between the expansion of formal schooling and other variables in the long run. However, the Barro-Lee historical panel of educational attainment may not be the best for identifying moments of change in educational expansion or research that requires identifying the timing of variation in formal schooling, as it contains values structurally estimated only by the trend.

Barro and Lee also present various results from the cross-country panel analysis using their own data sets. Although they have created balanced panels of educational attainment, the data sets for further analysis become unbalanced panels because other dependent and control variables, such as GDP per capita, fertility, and the democracy index, are not available for all the countries and years. Their development accounting shows that about 6 to 20 percent of the cross-country variation in output per worker can be explained by educational attainment. The contribution of human capital to economic growth is estimated to be a bit higher in growth accounting. The authors also present results from the three-stage least squares regressions with country fixed effects, which use lagged explanatory variables as instruments to deal with a possible endogeneity problem between education and the outcome variables — the growth rate of GDP per worker, fertility, and the democracy index. The results are not exactly the same as in the existing literature. The effect of educational attainment on growth is weak and statistically insignificant. The effect on fertility differs by gender. Women’s schooling leads to lower fertility, while men’s schooling is positively associated with fertility. The effect on democracy is nonlinear. Controlling for the country fixed effects, the higher average years of schooling, particularly of women, raise the democracy index at a decreasing rate. The panel regressions using the baseline data of 1950-2010 and the historical panel of 1870-2010 return similar results.

In Chapter 6, Barro and Lee repeat the panel regression analysis using another cross-country panel of 70 countries containing the quality-adjusted human capital stock measures from 1960 to 2010 at five-year intervals. The quality-adjusted human capital stock is calculated by weighting the average schooling years of each five-year birth cohort by the relevant test scores representing the quality of education and associated labor market returns. Their collection of standardized test scores spans 134 countries from 1965 to 2010 at the elementary and secondary school levels, despite a significant portion of the observations being missing, especially for the earlier period. Barro and Lee again fill the missing observations with estimates by linear interpolation or regional trends. The real and artificial standardized test scores for each five-year interval then become cohort-specific aggregate measures of school quality at each level of schools. The quality-adjusted panel of educational attainment is constructed in a similar way to the previous data sets. Further, from the panel IV regressions, Barro and Lee find that quality-adjusted educational attainment has a positive effect on the growth rates of GDP per worker if average years of schooling are controlled.

Education Matters offers a bird’s eye view of the role of education in the long-run development in the global context. It clearly shows the pioneering endeavor of Robert Barro and Jong-Wha Lee for the construction and analysis of their unique cross-country panels of educational attainment data. Anyone interested in cross-country analysis on the effect of human capital on economic, social, and political outcomes will undeniably find this volume a practically helpful starting point. This book also contains good teaching resources for undergraduate courses, such as maps showing the expansion of formal schooling in the world or figures presenting correlations between the average years of schooling and other socioeconomic indicators. On the other hand, the book may not be perfect for studying what really happened in history, as descriptions of historical or institutional backgrounds are not sufficiently accompanied by the valuable work of data construction and analysis. The book also contains little discussion of the contributions by economic history research to the literature on the rise of formal schooling and its associated effects on various outcomes since the nineteenth century.

References:

H. Barnard (1854), National Education in Europe: Being an Account of the Organization, Administration, Instruction and Statistics of Public Schools of Different Grades in the Principal States, New York: C.B. Norton.

A. Benavot and P. Riddle (1988), “The Expansion of Primary Education, 1870-1940: Trends and Issues,” Sociology of Education, 61(3): 191-210.

P. Lindert (2004), Growing Public, Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.

P. Monroe (1911), A Cyclopedia of Education, New York: Macmillan.

Sun Go is an Associate Professor of Economics at Chung-Ang University. His research focuses on the development of public school finance in the nineteenth-century United States and twentieth-century Korea.

Copyright (c) 2016 by EH.Net. All rights reserved. This work may be copied for non-profit educational uses if proper credit is given to the author and the list. For other permission, please contact the EH.Net Administrator (administrator@eh.net). Published by EH.Net (June 2016). All EH.Net reviews are archived at http://eh.net/book-reviews/

quinta-feira, 22 de dezembro de 2011

Manual de integracao para cobras e lagartos...


O Mercosul se arrasta

Editorial O Estado de S.Paulo, 22/12/2011

Confirmada em mais uma tediosa reunião de cúpula, a mediocridade continua sendo a grande marca do Mercosul, criado há 20 anos para promover a integração econômica de Brasil, Argentina, Paraguai e Uruguai e promover sua inserção no mercado global. O resultado mais importante da última reunião de cúpula, em Montevidéu, foi a decisão de ampliar a barreira comercial em torno do bloco, desta vez com a justificativa de proteção contra a crise nas principais economias do mundo. Nenhum problema interno foi resolvido e o comércio entre os sócios continua tão emperrado por medidas protecionistas quanto antes. A reunião serviu também para a assinatura de um acordo de livre comércio com a Palestina, um gesto político de escassa repercussão internacional e sem o mínimo valor econômico para os quatro países do Mercosul.

A única medida comercial de algum significado foi o aumento da lista de exceções à Tarifa Externa Comum. Cada governo poderá elevar o imposto de importação de até 100 produtos. O aumento valerá para mercadorias originárias de fora do bloco e o limite será a tarifa consolidada na OMC. Para o Brasil, o teto é de 35%.

É preciso, disse a presidente Dilma Rousseff, conter a "avalanche de importações predatórias" e proteger a economia dos países do Mercosul de "práticas ilegais e fraudulentas".

Nem todo produto da tal "avalanche" entra nos mercados da região por meio de práticas ilegais. A presidente incorreu, portanto, em certa confusão conceitual, até porque há remédios específicos contra fraudes e outras irregularidades. Mas, tomada em conjunto, a ampliação da lista de exceções tem sentido como ação anticrise, até porque um dos principais parceiros da região, a China, tentará vender mais à América do Sul para compensar o estreitamento dos mercados do mundo rico.

Elevar tarifas é em princípio uma solução ruim. Se for usada por muitos participantes do mercado, o comércio será travado e todos perderão. Mas a medida é pelo menos compatível com as normas internacionais e menos passível de contestação do que o protecionismo do Plano Brasil Maior, criticado até pelo diretor-geral da OMC, Pascal Lamy.

O recurso exclusivo à ampliação de barreiras está longe de ser um fato isolado. Os governos do Mercosul têm-se mostrado incapazes de formular e de aplicar políticas destinadas a aumentar a produtividade geral de suas economias e do bloco. Empresas ou segmentos produtivos são eficientes, mas seu poder de competição é prejudicado por deficiências de infraestrutura, pelas condições de financiamento e por erros de política econômica. Além disso, a integração das cadeias produtivas, uma forma de ganhar eficiência, nunca saiu dos discursos para a prática.

Incapazes de criar um espaço econômico integrado, os governos do Mercosul têm fracassado também na criação de vínculos com países de outras áreas. Nenhum acordo de livre comércio com uma grande economia foi celebrado pelo bloco. O projeto de maior alcance, a criação da Alca, foi liquidado pela união ideológica do petismo e do kirchnerismo. As negociações com a União Europeia permanecem num atoleiro. Diferenças entre Brasil e Argentina foram obstáculos importantes à conclusão do acordo.Ocasionalmente, o governo uruguaio mostrou interesse em negociações mais ambiciosas, mas sem resultado. O acordo com a Palestina enquadra-se no padrão habitual, já que a preferência pelos vínculos Sul-Sul também é essencialmente política. Houve acordos com sul-americanos. Estes, mais pragmáticos, trataram também de se associar aos EUA, criando uma espécie de Alca sem o Mercosul. Pior para o Mercosul.

O ingresso da Venezuela de Hugo Chávez como sócio pleno tornará mais difícil adotar políticas pragmáticas de inserção global. Falta a aprovação do Congresso paraguaio, impedida por oposicionistas descritos por Chávez como "mãos peludas". Sem essas mãos, o Mercosul teria virado, há muito tempo, mais um palco para as bravatas bolivarianas. Seria o golpe final contra um belo projeto.