O que é este blog?

Este blog trata basicamente de ideias, se possível inteligentes, para pessoas inteligentes. Ele também se ocupa de ideias aplicadas à política, em especial à política econômica. Ele constitui uma tentativa de manter um pensamento crítico e independente sobre livros, sobre questões culturais em geral, focando numa discussão bem informada sobre temas de relações internacionais e de política externa do Brasil. Para meus livros e ensaios ver o website: www.pralmeida.org. Para a maior parte de meus textos, ver minha página na plataforma Academia.edu, link: https://itamaraty.academia.edu/PauloRobertodeAlmeida;

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quinta-feira, 2 de novembro de 2017

OMC e o futuro do comercio internacional: China como economia de mercado - WSJ

Um dos mais importantes artigos que já li no Wall Street Journal: simplesmente o futuro do comércio internacional com a admissão (ainda oficiosa) da China como "economia de mercado" na OMC, e um estudo dos casos sendo examinados sob o seu sistema de solução de controvérsias. Repito: IMPORTANTE, para os que seguem o comércio internacional.
Paulo Roberto de Almeida

Globalization in Retreat

How China Swallowed the WTO

By Jacob M. Schlesinger
The Wall Street Journal, November 2, 2017
The U.S. helped create the group to smooth global commerce and integrate a rising China. Instead, it’s become a battleground for intense national rivalries

GENEVA—Inside the cement compound housing the World Trade Organization lies a colorful Chinese garden of cultivated rocks, arches and calligraphy. The gift from the Chinese commerce ministry symbolizes “world prosperity through cross-cultural fertilization,” according to a marble plaque.
It’s not the only way China has left its mark on the institution.
Sixteen years after becoming a member, the world’s second-largest economy is in an increasingly tense standoff with the U.S. and Europe that threatens to undermine the WTO’s authority as an arbiter of global trade.
The Chinese garden at the World Trade Organization’s Geneva headquarters. 
The Chinese garden at the World Trade Organization’s Geneva headquarters. Photo: Xinhua/ZUMA PRESS
 
Rather than fulfilling its mission of steering the Communist behemoth toward longstanding Western trading norms, the WTO instead stands accused of enabling Beijing’s state-directed mercantilism, in turn allowing China to flood the world with cheap exports while limiting foreign access to its own market.
“The WTO’s abject failure to address emerging problems caused by unfair practices from countries like China has put the U.S. at a great disadvantage,” Peter Navarro, a trade adviser to President Donald Trump, said in an interview. “The message to the WTO from this administration has been clear. Things have to change.”
Such criticism has percolated over many years in the U.S. with growing bipartisan intensity. Now it is coming to a head under the first American presidency of an open free-trade skeptic, in a case just starting to wend its way through the Geneva process. The issue: whether China has graduated to a “market economy,” a change of status that would make it considerably harder for other nations to block imports they believe are improperly aided by Chinese government distortions.
China has sued both the U.S. and European Union demanding the change, calling it “nonnegotiable,” and Chinese officials are likely to reiterate that demand when they talk trade next week with President Trump during his Beijing visit. Steelworkers have jammed the streets of Belgium and Germany protesting that ultimatum, while Europe’s parliament voted 546 to 28 to fight it, one Italian lawmaker saying acceptance “would be carrying out the suicide of the European industry.”

Focusing Eastward


As China’s share of global trade has grown rapidly...
Each nation's trade as a share of the global total
Exports
Imports
18
%
18
%
16
16
14
14
U.S.
China
12
12
10
10
U.S.
8
8
China
6
6
4
4
2
2
0
0
’15
’15
’05
’05
2000
1995
’10
’10
1995
2000
...the U.S. and other countries have ramped up accusations of unfair trading practices, and invoked those allegations to block Chinese imports.
Percentage of U.S. imports from China covered by restrictions
Imports affected by U.S. trade restrictions
9
%
China
Antidumping
8
S. Korea
7
Mexico
2016 estimate
6
2017 estimate
India
5
Japan
4
Canada
3
Antisubsidy*
Germany
2
France
1
U.K
0
$30
$20
$40
$10
$50
$0
billion
1995
2000
’05
’15
’10
*Countervailing duties
Sources: World Bank (exports and imports); Chad Bown, Peterson Institute for International Economics (restrictions)
“This is without question the most serious litigation matter we have at the WTO right now,” Robert Lighthizer, the Trump administration’s trade representative, told Congress in June. A China victory, he added, “would be cataclysmic for the WTO.”
Washington’s role challenging the WTO marks a reversal from the giddy mid-1990s heyday of globalization, and a reminder of how nationalism is increasingly the byword in global economic competition. When the WTO was forged in Morocco as a new international trade overseer, replacing the less-powerful General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, the Cold War had ended and the U.S., as the sole superpower, saw a chance to weave economies together around American-style capitalism.
GATT and the WTO have, over the past seven decades, greased the wheels of interdependence. Under Geneva’s guidance, tariffs world-wide have plunged nearly 80% and trade’s share of the global economy has more than doubled. More than 160 countries representing 98% of world commerce are now WTO members, and most of the few remaining nonmembers—like Belarus and Timor-Leste—are negotiating to join.
The WTO’s defenders say it still plays an important role. Roberto Azevedo, the director-general of the WTO, credits his organization with preventing a recurrence after the 2008 financial crisis of the trade wars that exacerbated the Great Depression. “If we didn’t have the WTO, we would be in much worse shape,” Mr. Azevedo said in an interview.
Mr. Azevedo, who as a Brazilian trade diplomat successfully used WTO courts to challenge American cotton subsidies, plays down U.S. complaints that his body isn’t properly equipped to handle China. “We have 164 countries,” he said. “China is one of those countries that have their own practices, their own methodologies. The system was designed to respond to that diversity.”
A view inside the WTO headquarters.
A view inside the WTO headquarters. Photo: Laurent Gillieron/Keystone/Associated Press
But critics say the system is badly in need of an overhaul. After the violent 1999 street battles that killed the Seattle round and the effective 2015 death of the Doha Development Round, the world trade regime has now gone nearly a quarter-century without a comprehensive rules upgrade—the longest such period since World War II.
These failures have elevated the importance and prominence of the WTO’s judicial system, as countries concluded their only option for advancing their cause in Geneva was litigation, not negotiation.
At the WTO, disputes are handled before “panels,” not “courts,” terminology carefully chosen in deference to home-country political concerns about sovereignty. In a similar vein, judges are called “members,” and wear business attire, not robes, though they do preside from an elevated bench.
The courts are structured as an arbitration system, with a dispute-settlement panel and a more powerful appellate body. WTO officials call the process their “crown jewel” and say members comply with 90% of its rulings.
One of the most active litigants has been Beijing.

Clogging the Courts


A growing number of those disputes have landed before the WTO...
Disputes involving the U.S.
Disputes filed with the WTO involving China
As respondent
Third party
Complainant
Complainant
Third party
As respondent
35
35
30
30
25
25
20
20
15
15
10
10
5
5
0
0
’17*
’15
’05
’00
’10
1995
’15
’17*
1995
’10
’05
’00
...helping feed a backlog, which is straining the WTO's legal system, extending the duration of cases, and fueling dissatisfaction with the process at a time when challenges rise against China. Complaints can take more than four years to be resolved.
Active WTO disputes per year
Length of dispute process, 1995–2016
Actual avg.
Official deadline for each step
40
35
From request to panel
30
25
From panel to report
20
Appeals (2-3 mos.)
15
Agreed time to
implement agreement
10
Compliance panel
5
From compliance
appeal to final report
0
12
6
18
0
months
’15
’10
2000
’05
’17*
1995
*Through October †Through September
Sources: WTO (dispute counts, disputes per year); Louise Johannesson and Petros C. Mavroidis (length of dispute process)
China’s 2001 WTO entry was a transformative moment. Negotiations took 15 years—longer than those creating the WTO itself—and included more strings and conditions than had been imposed on any other member. The shared, underlying assumption was that China’s economy was undergoing a historic transition from state-run to market-oriented, and that WTO membership would ensure, and accelerate, that evolution.
Most countries combine their WTO diplomatic corps with delegations to other global bodies in Geneva. Beijing built a mammoth stand-alone “Permanent Mission of the People’s Republic of China to World Trade Organization” about a mile up the shore of Lake Geneva, flying the large red flag with yellow star.
The Chinese government was at first shy about using the WTO courts, modeled after the unfamiliar Western legal system, and filed just one complaint in its first five years after joining. But the surge in Chinese exports following its WTO entry, which suddenly made it the world’s largest exporter, thrust Beijing into the center of the legal system.
Since 2007, China has been party to more than a quarter of all WTO cases, as trading partners scrambled to erect barriers protecting their industries while demanding better access to China’s markets.
Facing such pressures, Chinese officials set about to master the process. China sought out disputes in which it had no direct stake and joined more than 100 as a “third party,” giving officials access to proceedings as observers. The Chinese offered large stipends to prominent American and European trade-law scholars to teach seminars in China for young bureaucrats. They retained top U.S. law firms. Steptoe & Johnson LLP became the go-to firm for combating a new American policy imposing extra-steep duties on Chinese imports aided by allegedly illegal subsidies; one member of the Steptoe China team had staffed the WTO appellate body for six years.
Chinese steel is among the many trade items in dispute between the U.S. and China.
Chinese steel is among the many trade items in dispute between the U.S. and China. Photo: Wang He/Getty Images
Beijing’s lawyers started notching notable court wins over the Americans who shaped the system. In a series of rulings from 2011 through May 2017, the appellate body concluded that Washington had cut too many corners in asserting that the state underwrites Chinese exports. Those decisions, covering four dozen industries, from off-road tires to wind towers to, literally, kitchen sinks, raised the bar for U.S. policy makers trying to block Chinese imports. And they complicated American efforts to impose higher duties on Chinese goods.
WTO defenders note the U.S. has still won the vast majority of cases it has filed in Geneva, and say it should be pleased that China has chosen to pursue its trade grievances through global arbiters.
“Since our accession to the WTO, China has always followed the WTO rules,” Cui Tiankai, China’s ambassador to the U.S., said in a recent interview with a Chinese TV station. “Sometimes we don’t have 100% agreement with them, but still we play by the rules. I hope America could do the same.”
The losses rankled the Washington trade community. In May 2016, aides to then-President Barack Obama cited two rulings favoring China as part of a broader list of grievances designed to block the reappointment of a South Korean judge on the appellate body.
At a tense meeting at WTO headquarters, the U.S. delegate told fellow trade diplomats that the judge, South Korean law professor Seung Wha Chang, had shown a pattern of judicial overreach and suggested that he had acted as an “independent investigator or prosecutor” on behalf of parties such as Beijing.
It was seen as a surprisingly hostile act in the genteel Geneva community. Thirteen veteran WTO jurists complained the U.S. had traversed “a Rubicon that must not be crossed,” putting “the very future of the entire WTO trading system at risk.” Mr. Chang himself responded through an interview with a Korean newspaper, saying he had been made a scapegoat. He added that the U.S. may have wanted him removed before the trade court heard a pending challenge to American restrictions on South Korean washing machine exports., an insinuation U.S. officials have rejected.
The WTO includes more than 160 countries representing 98% of world commerce.
The WTO includes more than 160 countries representing 98% of world commerce. Photo: Denis Balibouse/REUTERS
The Chang tensions exposed a bigger problem: The WTO’s failure to complete negotiating rounds aimed at updating rules for 21st-century business has forced judges to use often-outdated 1990s guidelines in settling disputes. That has fed complaints that the WTO courts were relying increasingly on their own interpretations of those rules, engaging in judicial overreach and activism.
Peter Van den Bossche, a Belgian judge on the appellate body, wrote a 2015 essay warning of the “dangerous institutional imbalance in the WTO between its ‘judicial’ branch and its political ‘rule-making’ branch,” that could “drastically weaken” the system.
Since the WTO doesn’t have detailed rules governing Chinese-type state-owned-enterprises, some observers say jurists have had to make decisions case by case.
The Trump administration has escalated the Obama administration’s battle over the appellate body, blocking appointments of any new judges and sparking fights even with members sympathetic to the U.S. campaign against China. By year’s end, the seven-member appellate body will have three vacancies, heightening worries about its ability to manage a mounting backlog and a looming “tsunami of cases,” as one judge warned in a recent speech. At an Aug. 31 meeting of the committee overseeing the courts, the U.S. said it would block any attempt to fill those slots until its “longstanding” complaints about the courts were addressed.
That’s just one of many ways Mr. Trump is testing the WTO. He’s staffing his trade team with longtime WTO detractors. As private lawyers, both Mr. Lighthizer and Gilbert Kaplan, nominated to be the Commerce Department’s trade point-man, helped shape strategy for U.S. industries combating Chinese imports after its WTO entry. Both won protections from the U.S. government—Mr. Lighthizer for steel pipes, Mr. Kaplan for various types of paper—that were later deemed improper by the WTO appellate body for taking too many liberties in asserting Chinese misbehavior.
There’s no sign Mr. Trump intends to follow through on the idea he once floated during the 2016 campaign of pulling the U.S. out of the organization. But aides have said they are exploring a number of policies that openly challenge the WTO’s authority, reflecting their skepticism about the body’s ability to handle China. They have openly discussed imposing sanctions unilaterally against China. Commerce Secretary Wilbur Ross in April launched an official study of “the structural problem” of the WTO and its courts, arguing the body has “an institutional bias…toward the exporters rather than toward the people that are being beleaguered by inappropriate imports.”

Who Wins at the WTO

The success rate of WTO members in filing claims, or defending against them, at the dispute panel level


Won claims it filed against
another member
Won claims filed against it
U.S.
E.U.
Canada
Korea
Mexico
Japan
Brazil
Argentina
India
China
60
40
20
80
0%
Note: Includes cases from 1995 through Feb. 23, 2016; countries shown were involved in at least 10 cases.
Source: Louise Johannesson and Petros C. Mavroidis
Research shows WTO courts tend to favor countries suing to challenge trade barriers over those defending them. In a study of all WTO disputes litigated from 1995 through early 2016 for the Journal of World Trade, Louise Johannesson and Petros Mavroidis concluded the plaintiffs won 71% of the claims filed at the panel level. But their data also show the U.S. is one of the most successful plaintiffs, winning far more of the cases at the panel level that it initiates than China does.
A looming challenge to the WTO is the pending case determining China’s official status in the world trading system—whether members are now required to treat it as a “market” economy. The debate is complicated because there appears to be no clear answer in WTO rules, which some participants say were left intentionally vague in the agreement governing China’s entry.
Beijing reads the pact as having automatically guaranteed it market status 15 years after its December 2001 accession. The U.S., Europe, Japan and others say the change was intended to be a privilege contingent on liberalization promises Beijing has yet to keep.
The penalty China pays for its WTO label as a “nonmarket economy” is high, as would be China’s benefits for wiping it away. The “nonmarket” designation makes it easier for trading partners to impose inflated tariffs on goods they conclude have been “dumped”—or sold below “fair” value. That’s because prices and costs are seen as so distorted in a “nonmarket economy” that other countries are given wide latitude to determine on their own what they consider “fair.” That contrasts with a stricter burden of proof and analysis required when leveling the same charges against a “market economy.”
A flip from “nonmarket” to “market” would boost EU imports from China by as much as 21%, or $84 billion, according to a 2016 study by CEPII, a French-government affiliated think tank on international economics. The same report noted the U.S. uses the nonmarket discretion more aggressively than the EU, both slapping penalties on a greater portion of Chinese imports and applying a steeper rate. The study concluded that Washington applied an average duty of 162% against Chinese goods, compared with a 33% rate for market economies.
China has waged a diplomatic campaign asking nations to grant it market status, winning over more than 70 countries, mainly in Africa, Latin America and Asia. On Dec. 12, 2016—the day after the 15th anniversary of its accession—Beijing filed separate complaints in Geneva against the U.S. and the EU demanding similar treatment from them, arguing that the stance of the two Western powers “nullify or impair benefits accruing to China.”
The European case is moving first, and a panel was appointed in July with veteran arbiters from Jamaica, Switzerland and New Zealand. The deliberations are likely to take more than a year, but interest is already intense, an unusually high 20 countries registering as “third parties,” including Ecuador, Russia, Tajikistan, and Japan.
WTO defenders and critics alike say the Geneva courts are the wrong way to resolve what are ultimately political and economic questions left ambiguous in the underlying rules.
“That gray zone is the key point of tension,” says Chad Bown, a WTO expert at the pro-free-trade Peterson Institute for International Economics. “How you deal with that is ultimately going to determine whether the WTO system in its current form can hang together or not.”
Write to Jacob M. Schlesinger at jacob.schlesinger@wsj.com

Academia.edu: Analytics de outubro 2017 - Paulo Roberto de Almeida

O resumo que me oferece a plataforma Academia.edu sobre o acesso a meus trabalhos no mês de outubro de 2017:

Your Impact from October 01, 2017 to October 31, 2017

1,458  Views
849  Unique Visitors
231  Downloads
269  Cities
97   Universities
       Universidade de São Paulo     7
       More    92
34   Countries
        Brazil    725
        Unknown  28 (na certa serviços secretos...)
        United States   20
       Portugal    18
        Mozambique   7
        Other countries    29
810 Research Fields
        History of Brazilian Foreign Relations     55
        Economic Diplomacy      53
        Politica Externa brasileira no governo lula   51
        Brazilian Political Economy      46
        Political Development     43
        More 95
49   Job Titles
       Graduate Student    23
       Faculty Member     19
       Student    41
       More  44
6,705   Pages Read
           Unknown Paper     463
           More 118
40    Traffic Sources
        Direct   440
        google.com.br     220
        Google    203
        diplomatizzando.blogspot.com.br   176
        Academia.edu Profile    135
1297) Contra a antiglobalização: Contradições, insuficiências e impasses do movimento antiglobalizador (2004)348 (30 days views) 265 (30 days uniques65 (30 days downloads)4,570 (all time views)

quarta-feira, 1 de novembro de 2017

A Culture of Growth: The Origins of the Modern Economy - Joel Mokyr

Published by EH.Net (November 2017)
Joel Mokyr, A Culture of Growth: The Origins of the Modern Economy. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2017. xiv + 403 pp. $35 (cloth), ISBN: 978-0-691-16888-3.
Reviewed for EH.Net by Claude Diebolt, Department of Economics, University of Strasbourg.
 I enjoyed this new book by Joel Mokyr, which is praiseworthy for its elegance and erudition. It tells the story of economic growth with “culture” — a mushy word for most of us — as the invisible hand. However, I regret the lack of in-depth consideration of the German language literature. Significantly more attention could also have been given to economic cycles. Werner Sombart, for example (Der moderne Kapitalismus and Der Bourgeois. Zur Geistesgeschichte des modernen Wirtschaftsmenschen), was the first to come to mind while reading this fantastic book. It also reminds me of George Akerlof and Robert Schiller’s Animal Spirits, where confidence, fear, a propensity to gamble, and follow-the-leader effect stories are presented as central to explain the decision making process. The Bourgeois Trilogy by Deirdre McCloskey is another seminal work in that spirit: ideas, not capital or institutions enriched the world. A growth theorist would probably also see strong connections between Mokyr’s latest effort and the unified growth theory initiated by Oded Galor.

The book is about the roots of the Industrial Revolution, the Great Enrichment, and radical changes in values, beliefs, and preferences. It is not about a mass movement. It is a phenomenon related to an elite: philosophers and scientists of course, but also engineers, instrument makers, and even industrialists who spawned the process. In any case, it is a minority of the population. Mokyr’s ambition is to understand and to explain how these beliefs and values emerged — why some people developed new ideas and why these ideas replaced the ones in place.
According to Mokyr, we know pretty much what happened, how it happened and where it happened, but we still do not know why it happened. Why, after thousands of years of stagnation, have a number of countries and regions of the world experienced an unprecedented increase in both the scale and speed of their economic growth? Why Europe and not China? Why England? Is it the result of happenstance? The Black Death perhaps? What about the influence of religion (Max Weber and the Protestant ethic?), of major intellectual and scientific personalities who changed the game (Martin Luther, Francis Bacon, Isaac Newton, Adam Smith, Charles Darwin)? What role should be given to natural resource saturation, innovation (the compass, gunpowder, printing) and capital accumulation, trade networks, market institutions and organizations, ideas, violence (battles, dynastic arrangements, power struggles…), women, etc.? For Mokyr, the Gordian knot is a Culture of Growth — a \”Useful knowledge,\” scientific and technological knowledge, the meeting of motivations and incentives, of attitudes and aptitudes toward Nature and the ability to persuade others. These are the key elements of the puzzle.
“No theory-no history! Theory is the pre-requisite to any scientific writing of history,” wrote Werner Sombart (1929) in the Economic History Review. I urge you to carefully read Joel Mokyr’s evolutionary approach to culture in the spirit of Schumpeter’s theory on Unternehmergeist. It will give you a fresh insight into one of the most fascinating questions in our field: the origins of the Great Enrichment. It will invite everyone to visit economic history with an optimistic vision for the future of the World!

Claude Diebolt is CNRS Research Professor of Economics at the University of Strasbourg and editor of the journal Cliometrica.
Copyright (c) 2017 by EH.Net. All rights reserved. This work may be copied for non-profit educational uses if proper credit is given to the author and the list. For other permission, please contact the EH.Net Administrator (administrator@eh.net). Published by EH.Net (November 2017). All EH.Net reviews are archived at http://www.eh.net/BookReview.

Desglobalizacao - Marcos Troyjo, Paulo Roberto de Almeida, Sergio Florencio (Ipea, 8/11)


A palestra “Reglobalização”, a ser  proferida  por Marcos Troyjo, Diretor do Centro de Estudos sobre Brasil, Rússia, Índia e China (BRICLab), da Columbia University, em Nova York, onde é Professor-adjunto de Relações Internacionais, será realizada no dia 08 de novembro próximo.
Os debates serão coordenados por Paulo Roberto de Almeida, diretor do Instituto de Pesquisa em Relações Internacionais –IPRI/FUNAG e por Sérgio Abreu e Lima Florêncio, Diretor de Estudos e Relações Econômicas Internacionais -DINTE/IPEA.
Data e Local:  08 de novembro de 2017, Auditório do Divonzir Gusso, Setor Bancário Sul, quadra 1, bloco J, Edifício BNDES/IPEA-Brasília, das 15h às 17h30.
Solicito confirmação sobre sua participação, por meio do e-mail dinte@ipea.gov.br ou pelos telefones (61) 2026- 5527 ou 2026-5338.
Sua participação nos debates será muito bem vinda.
Atenciosamente,
Sergio Abreu e Lima Florencio.
Diretor de Estudos e Relações Econômicas Internacionais (DINTE/IPEA).

Mandarinato: pagamento de R$ 39,5 milhoes em auxílio-moradia retroativo a juizes do RN

Os mandarins da nossa republiqueta que estão afundando a República.
Certas coisas -- essas coisas, como auxilio moradia de quase 4 mil reais, para quem já ganha praticamente no teto, senão extra-teto e acima do teto, ridículo, por sinal -- deveriam ser moralmente caracterizadas como CRIME HEDIONDO, e seus beneficiários deveriam ser processados como LADRÕES que são.
Pensem nisto: milhões de brasileiros pobres trabalham duramente, durante todo o ano, e deixam, praticamente, um terço, senão dois quintos do que ganham – os mais pobres talvez até 50% – para o Estado, sob a forma de impostos diretos e indiretos, apenas para que esses mandarins sem vergonha, esses marajás indecorosos tenham, além de um salári elevado, diversas prebendas, penduricalhos, gratificações, bonificações, que são INACEITÁVEIS sob qualquer ponto de vista.
Paulo Roberto de Almeida
Brasília, 1 de novembro de 2017

Ministro mantém pagamento de R$ 39,5 milhões em auxílio-moradia retroativo a juízes do RN
POR CONGRESSO EM FOCO | 01/11/2017 13:40
CATEGORIA(S): 
ECONOMIA BRASILEIRAJUDICIÁRIONOTÍCIASOUTROS DESTAQUES


http://static.congressoemfoco.uol.com.br/2016/12/Marco-Aur%C3%A9lio-e1509550230671.jpg
Nelson Jr. / SCO/STF

Apesar de afirmar ser contra o benefício, ministro entendeu que CNJ não cumpriu processo administrativo e concedeu liminar 
https://t.dynad.net/pc/?dc=5550003218;ord=1509552896880
O ministro do Supremo Tribunal Federal (STF) Marco Aurélio Mello concedeu decisão liminar para garantir o pagamento de auxílio-moradia a 218 juízes e desembargadores do Rio Grande do Norte. Os valores chegam a R$ 39,5 milhões, correspondente aos pagamentos desde 2012. O auxílio-moradia dos juízes e desembargadores é de R$ 4.377,73 ao mês.
Uma decisão de João Otávio de Noronha, do Conselho Nacional de Justiça (CNJ), no início de outubro, determinava que os juízes e desembargadores que receberam os pagamentos devolvessem o dinheiro aos cofres públicos. De acordo com a Coluna do Estadão do jornal O Estado de S. Paulo, Marco Aurélio considerou que os montantes pagos já integram o patrimônio dos beneficiados e sustou a exigência da devolução.

Ao jornal, o ministro do STF afirmou que é contra o auxílio-moradia, mas que concedeu a liminar porque o CNJ não cumpriu o devido processo administrativo. Em sua decisão, o ministro também requer informações do Conselho Nacional de Justiça e parecer da procuradoria-geral da República.
Verba indenizatória

Por ser considerada uma verba indenizatória, o auxílio-moradia não é contabilizado como salário e não é descontado no chamado “abate-teto”, desconto para manter as remunerações dentro do teto constitucional do serviço público – atualmente estabelecido em R$ 33,7 mil, equivalente ao salário de um ministro do STF. Dessa maneira, os 218 magistrados potiguares receberam até R$ 211 mil referente ao auxílio-moradia desde 2012, de uma só vez, no mês de outubro.
Em entrevista ao Congresso em Foco no início de outubro, o presidente da Associação de Magistrados Brasileiros (AMB) defendeu que é preciso distinguir verba indenizatória de remuneração de magistrados. Segundo Jayme de Oliveira, o teto do funcionalismo tem sido respeitado, e os passivos que eventualmente ultrapassam os R$ 33,7 mil não podem ser contabilizadas como remuneração. Na realidade, são “passivos que têm de ser pagos”, afirmou ele.


Macro e microeconomia da diplomacia - Paulo Roberto de Almeida

Um trabalho antigo, mas do qual recebo, agora, o novo link, restaurado, pela editoria da revista.


308. “Macro e microeconomia da diplomacia”, Espaço Acadêmico (Maringá: UEM, Ano I, nº 8, ISSN: 1519.6186; janeiro de 2002; links: http://periodicos.uem.br/ojs/index.php/EspacoAcademico/article/view/35903; pdf para o artigo: http://periodicos.uem.br/ojs/index.php/EspacoAcademico/article/view/35903/20992). Relação de trabalhos nº 839.


Macro e microeconomia da diplomacia

Paulo Roberto de Almeida
Autor de Formação da Diplomacia Econômica no Brasil

A política externa possui a sua própria economia, que poderia ser definida como a forma pela qual os diplomatas organizam seus recursos escassos (talentos, discursos, missões de representação, reuniões bilaterais, participação em foros multilaterais, enfim coqueteis e recepções), que poderiam ter usos alternativos, na produção de determinados “bens” diplomáticos (tratados, acordos, convênios de cooperação), em função de custos e benefícios percebidos no processo diplomático, segundo uma alocação “ótima” desses recursos. Esses bens ou “mercadorias” serão depois distribuídos para o consumo da sociedade que emprega esses diplomatas, sob a forma de melhores oportunidades de exportação, maior segurança externa, novas possibilidades de usufruir e de conceder cooperação externa, captura de talentos externos, fontes adicionais de financiamento, bref, qualquer resultado suscetível de maximizar o bem estar nacional.
Em função dessa definição ampla, pode-se ter uma macroeconomia da diplomacia – que trataria, mais bem, do produto bruto diplomático, do pleno emprego e da renda diplomática, sua distribuição entre os próprios, bem como das questões de concorrência entre diplomatas, ou do monopólio que alguns exercem sobre determinadas atividades – ou uma microeconomia, voltada, por exemplo, para a produtividade marginal do diplomata (ou seus rendimentos decrescentes), a economia de escala numa Secretaria de Estado, a especialização, a divisão do trabalho e a interdependência nas lides diplomáticas, bem como os fatores de depreciação de um diplomata, que só deveria normalmente intervir depois de uma análise atuarial sobre sua função de lucros e perdas (sem qualquer abuso contábil, entenda-se), embora em alguns casos se recomende uma forte injeção fiscal.
No plano internacional igualmente, o que aliás é o próprio da diplomacia, deve-se considerar as vantagens comparativas dos diversos serviços diplomáticos, os fluxos de capital diplomático de um país a outro, os mecanismos de câmbio diplomático (que podem implicar a desvalorização de alguns e a valorização de outros), as assimetrias existentes entre os diversos serviços, bem como a atuação dos governos, que influenciam o desempenho do produto diplomático ou seu posicionamento no cenário internacional (através de subsídios maciços, por exemplo). Nos tempos que correm, de globalização das relações exteriores e de neoliberalismo diplomático, já não são mais operacionais as antigas doutrinas socialistas da diplomacia, muito embora muitos ainda acreditem no caráter de classe da política externa, tanto que continuam a achar que os diplomatas são todos uns “punhos de renda”, que vivem de salto alto pulando de uma recepção para outra. Poucos se dão conta, entretanto, que com a depreciação das línguas e o acesso disseminado a recursos externos via Internet – afinal de contas, hoje em dia qualquer um fala inglês e até cachorro de madame já tem correio eletrônico –, o diplomata perdeu seu antigo monopólio (e fonte de lucros?), tendo seus salários tão depreciados que formou-se, nos estratos inferiores ou iniciais da carreira, um verdadeiro lumpesinato diplomático, verdadeiro exército industrial de reserva diplomático que moureja em condições pouco condizentes com sua antiga aura de fama e brilho.
Os exercícios que se seguem ostentam a preocupação de determinar como os fatores de produção da atividade diplomática têm seus preços fixados no mercado, o que conformaria, idealmente, uma teoria da distribuição diplomática. Na prática, porém, as relações de poder são tão ou mais importantes, na vida diplomática, que as relações de mercado, que são fortemente condicionadas pela intervenção dos governos, os patronos por excelência dos diplomatas, que não podem assim exercer livremente seus talentos (tanto porque o mercado para eles é imperfeito, com vários monopólios “naturais”). Tentaremos, sem embargo, examinar os modelos alternativos de distribuição diplomática, sabendo que alguns elementos – vaidade, compadrio, pistolões – terão de ser deixados de lado, uma vez que dificilmente são mensuráveis a ponto de permitir sua integração numa equação matemática ou numa curva de regressão. O autor espera contribuir mediante este esforço para a conformação de uma verdadeira teoria econômica da diplomacia, vertente pouco explorada da ciência econômica que ainda aguarda o seu Marx, o seu Keynes, o seu Hayek ou o seu Friedman (muito embora ela tenha tido entre nós essa figura híbrida que foi Roberto Campos). Essa teoria da economia diplomática deveria compreender, ademais das funções conhecidas em economia – basicamente derivadas das leis da oferta e da procura diplomática – uma teoria do crescimento diplomático, que enfocaria também os problemas de desenvolvimento dessa profissão hoje banalizada (com tratamento de itens específicos como a pobreza a qualidade de vida do diplomata, a discriminação de gêneros nos padrões ocupacionais e, eventualmente, no plano externo, a questão do tratamento preferencial e mais favorável para os diplomatas de menor desenvolvimento relativo).
Aqueles que discordarem dos cálculos econométricos do autor, podem contatá-lo no seguinte endereço: pralmeida@mac.com. Para maiores esclarecimentos sobre os fundamentos da teoria econômica aqui desenvolvida, recomendo consultar os manuais disponíveis no mercado, sendo que o “velho” livro introdutório de Paul A. Samuelson permanece supreendentemente atual (pelo menos para os padrões dos diplomatas), mas ele poderia ser utilmente complementado pela teoria do comércio diplomático estratégico de Paul Krugman.

     Algumas questões de economia diplomática (tratamento sucessivo em capítulos).
1) O Itamaraty dispõe de um “monopólio natural” no terreno da política externa; não tem concorrentes no País, ou muito poucos;
2) Ele tem inegáveis “vantagens comparativas estáticas” para tratar dos assuntos que são os seus, mas outros serviços estão criando vantagens comparativas dinâmicas;
3) Ele apresenta “economias de escala”, que podem ser ainda mais otimizadas com a modernização de seus métodos de trabalho: ele faz bom faz uso de seus recursos escassos?
4) Quais “externalidades” influenciam o trabalho do Itamaraty?
5) Pode-se medir a “produtividade marginal” de um diplomata?
6) Quais seria a relação de “custo-benefício” do diplomata: a estabilidade é um asset ou uma liability?
7) Como poderia ser operado o “controle do fluxo produtivo” e o “ciclo dos produtos” no Itamaraty?; pode-se obter maiores ganhos com uma nova estrutura organizacional e nova apresentação dos produtos?; uma estratégia de marketing é aconselhável?
8) Como colocar em funcionamento a “defesa da concorrência” no Itamaraty?; ele pode operar segundo os princípios da “market contestability”?; havendo maior osmose/abertura em relação à sociedade civil sua relação capital-produto seria melhor?
9) Como apresentar a “contabilidade” do Itamaraty?: nos tempos dos velhos Relatórios do Império isso era mais fácil, agora é difícil obter-se até mesmo um “relatório aos credores”;
10) Crescimento zero da diplomacia?; como enfrentar a obsolecência das técnicas produtivas e a depreciação do capital diplomático?

Respostas tentativas a estas questões (por certo não exaustivas) nos próximos capítulos deste folhetim.

Paulo Roberto de Almeida
Washington, 14/12/2001; Relação de Originais n. 839; Relação de Publicados n. 308.
Espaço Acadêmico (Maringá: UEM, Ano I, nº 8, ISSN: 1519-6186; janeiro de 2002; links: http://periodicos.uem.br/ojs/index.php/EspacoAcademico/article/view/35903; pdf para o artigo: http://periodicos.uem.ßbr/ojs/index.php/EspacoAcademico/article/view/35903/20992).